



KYOGLE FLOOD EMERGENCY SUB PLAN

A Sub Plan of the Local Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)

Volume 1 of the Kyogle Council Flood Emergency Sub Plan

Endorsed by the Northern Rivers Local Emergency Management Committee Endorsed Date: 1st September 2023

AUTHORISATION

The Kyogle Council Flood Emergency Sub Plan is a sub plan of the Kyogle Council Local Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN). It has been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the State Emergency Service Act 1989 (NSW) and is endorsed by the Local Emergency Management Committee in accordance with the provisions of the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW).

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1st September 2023

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VERSION HISTORY

Version Number	Description	Date
1	Kyogle Local Flood Plan	March 1994
2	Kyogle Local Flood Plan	July 2013
3	Kyogle Local Flood Plan	September 2023

AMENDMENT LIST

Suggestions for amendments to this plan should be forwarded to: Manager Emergency Planning NSW State Emergency Service PO Box 6126, Wollongong NSW 2500 <u>nswses.communityplanning@ses.nsw.gov.au</u>

Amendments in the list below have been entered in this plan.

Amendment Number	Description	Updated by	Date
1	Amendment to Section 1.4 Scope	Hayden Doolan	21 November 2023

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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1 OUTLINE AND SCOPE

1.1 PURPOSE

1.1.1 The purpose of this plan is to set out the multi-agency arrangements for the emergency management of flooding in the Kyogle Council Local Government Area (LGA).

1.2 AUTHORITY

- 1.2.1 This plan is written and issued under the authority of the <u>State Emergency and Rescue</u> <u>Management Act 1989 (NSW)</u> ('SERM Act'), the <u>State Emergency Service</u> <u>Act 1989</u> (NSW) ('SES Act') and the NSW State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN).
- 1.2.2 This plan is a sub plan to the Northern Rivers Local Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN) and is endorsed by the Northern Rivers Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC).

1.3 ACTIVATION

- 1.3.1 This plan does not require activation. The arrangements set out in this plan are always active.
- 1.3.2 The Northern Rivers Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN) is active at all times in anticipation of the need to coordinate support and resources requested by combat agencies, including the NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES).

1.4 SCOPE

- 1.4.1 The area covered by this plan is the Kyogle Council LGA. The Kyogle Council LGA and its principal towns, villages, rivers and creeks are shown in Appendix A.
- 1.4.2 This area also partially covers flood operations within the Tabulam and Urbenville areas. Tabulam, although located in the Kyogle LGA is situated on the Clarence River, whilst Urbenville is located in the Tenterfield Shire boundaries and situated on the Toolom Creek, a tributary of the Clarence River.
- 1.4.3 The Council area, and the Urbenville and Tabulam areas, are in the NSW SES North Eastern Zone and for emergency management purposes, is part of the North Coast Emergency Management Region.
- 1.4.4 The plan sets out the Kyogle Council level emergency management arrangements for prevention, preparation, response and initial recovery for flooding in the Kyogle Council LGA.
- 1.4.5 In this plan a flood is defined as a relatively high-water level which overtops the natural or artificial banks in any part of a stream, river, estuary, lake or dam, and/or local overland flooding associated with drainage before entering a watercourse and inundation resulting from super-elevated sea levels and/or waves (including tsunami) overtopping coastline defences.
- 1.4.6 This plan outlines the local level arrangements for the management of downstream consequences of flooding due to dam failure, however it does not cover the management of flooding of an underground mine by inrush or other cause, which should be covered by the Mine Emergency Sub Plan for the respective mine.

1.5 GOALS

- 1.5.1 The primary goals for flood emergency management in NSW are:
 - a. Protection and preservation of life.
 - b. Establishment and operation of flood warning systems.
 - c. Issuing of community information and community warnings.
 - d. Coordination of evacuation and welfare of affected communities.
 - e. Protection of critical infrastructure and community assets essential to community survival during an emergency incident.
 - f. Protection of residential property.
 - g. Protection of assets and infrastructure that support individual and community financial sustainability and aid assisting a community to recover from an incident.
 - h. Protection of the environment and conservation values considering the cultural, biodiversity and social values of the environment.

1.6 KEY PRINCIPLES

- 1.6.1 The protection and preservation of human life (including the lives of responders and the community) is the highest priority.
- 1.6.2 Evacuation is the primary response strategy for people impacted by flooding.

1.7 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- 1.7.1 General responsibilities of emergency service organisations and functional areas are set out in the NSW State EMPLAN and NSW State Flood Sub Plan.
- 1.7.2 Specific roles and responsibilities for agencies, functional areas and organisations in relation to flooding within Kyogle Council are detailed within this plan, Appendix B and Appendix C.
- 1.7.3 Any agency with agreed responsibilities in this plan that are temporarily unable, or no longer able to fulfil their responsibilities in response operations must as soon as possible notify:
 - a. The NSW SES Incident Controller (for local or zone level responsibilities during response operations).
 - b. The NSW SES Zone Duty Commander (for regional level responsibilities outside of response operations).

1.8 PLAN MAINTENANCE AND REVIEW

- 1.8.1 NSW SES will maintain the currency of this plan by:
 - a. Ensuring that all supporting emergency services and functional areas, organisations and officers mentioned in it are aware of their roles and responsibilities.
 - b. Conduct a minimum of one exercise every five years or within two years of the plan being reviewed.

- c. Reviewing the contents of the plan:
 - When there are changes which alter agreed plan arrangements.
 - When changes to land use strategic plans and policies increase the population at risk.
 - After a flood including recommendations from after action reviews, reports, or inquiries.
 - As determined by the NSW SES Commissioner.
- d. The plan is to be reviewed no less frequently than every five years or after a significant flood event.

1.9 SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS

- 1.9.1 Supplementary and supporting material of the Local Flood Emergency Sub Plan is maintained on the <u>NSW SES website Flood, Storm and Tsunami Plans</u> including:
 - a. Flood Plan Glossary.
 - b. NSW SES Dam Failure Notification Flowchart.
 - c. NSW SES Resupply Flowchart.

2 OVERVIEW OF NSW FLOOD HAZARD AND RISK

2.1 THE FLOOD THREAT

- 2.1.1 NSW SES maintains information on the nature of flooding and effects of flooding on the community in the Kyogle Council LGA.
- 2.1.2 Declared dams in or upstream of the Kyogle Local Government Area.

Dam Name	Owner	High Risk Dam
Toonumbar Dam	Water NSW	No
Petrochilos Dam	Kyogle Council	No

3 PREVENTION/ MITIGATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1.1 The Flood Risk Management Manual outlines the NSW Government's Flood Prone Land Policy which details the framework for managing flood prone land in New South Wales. Incorporation of floodplain risk management into land use planning is one of the key means to limit the exposure to flood risks to our communities and help build long term resilience to future flood events.

3.2 LAND USE PLANNING

3.2.1 **Strategy:** Effective land use planning is a key focus for minimising the impacts of flooding. NSW SES will work with land use planning and consent authorities to inform and influence the consideration of the risks arising from flood, storm and tsunami, to prevent the creation of intolerable impacts of these hazards on the community.

Actions:

- a. NSW SES will provide strategic input about land use planning matters which have or will create significant flood risk to life and/or property due to flooding.
- b. NSW SES will provide responses to land use planning proposal referrals that have or will create significant flood risk to life and/or property due to flooding.

3.3 FLOODPLAIN RISK MANAGEMENT

3.3.1 **Strategy**: Advocate for consideration of emergency management in decision making to reduce risks to the existing community and minimise the growth in future, continuing and residual risk due to development through input to the floodplain management program.

Actions:

- a. NSW SES will provide coordinated and consistent emergency management advice to councils and other agencies in relation to the management of land that is subject to flooding or inundation.
- b. NSW SES will provide advice, support, technical resources and training for NSW SES representatives to contribute effectively on local Floodplain Management Committees.

4 **PREPARATION**

4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 Preparation includes arrangements or plans to deal with an emergency or the effects of an emergency.

4.2 FLOOD EMERGENCY PLANNING

4.2.1 **Strategy**: NSW SES develop, review and maintain Flood Emergency Sub Plans.

- a. Develop and review this NSW SES Local Flood Emergency Sub Plan as required. Local Flood Emergency Sub Plans outline the specific arrangements for management of flood events within an LGA and may include cross boundary arrangements.
- b. Review plans as per Section 1.8.
- 4.2.2 Local EMPLAN Consequence Management Guides (CMG's) for flood are not required for communities covered by NSW SES Local Flood Emergency Sub Plans

however may be utilised in place of Local Flood Emergency Sub Plan if agreed to by NSW SES.

4.3 FLOOD INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

4.3.1 **Strategy**: NSW SES develop and maintain a flood intelligence system to identify flood behaviour, its impact on the community and required response actions.

Actions:

- a. Gather and assess flood information for the full range of flood types and severities.
- b. Collect, collate, and assess information on the characteristics of communities at risk and the potential effects of flooding on communities at risk.
- c. Share flood intelligence information with supporting agencies.

4.4 DEVELOPMENT OF WARNING SYSTEMS

4.4.1 **Strategy**: Develop, maintain and prepare systems for the provision of flood warnings and associated warning services.

- a. All levels of government work in partnership to develop and maintain flood warning infrastructure.
- b. NSW SES maintains a list of the requirements for flood warnings for flood gauges in NSW (including flood classifications, warning times required and key statistics) and can be found in the supplementary document to the NSW State Flood Plan (see Section 1.9).
- c. NSW SES will recommend new warning services and changes to warning alert levels for gauges to the NSW and ACT Flood Warning Consultative Committee.
- d. The State Government, in partnership with Local Government, is responsible for developing and maintaining flash flood warning systems for local catchments where required.
- e. Dam Owners will provide Dam Emergency Plans (where required) and consult with NSW SES on alert levels and messaging. Alert level definitions are listed in Dam Emergency Plans.
- f. NSW SES maintains a dedicated dam failure hotline and procedures to ensure priority dissemination of dam failure warnings.
- g. NSW SES develops and maintains warning and flood information products by:
 - Utilising flood intelligence data.
 - Developing warning and flood information products.
 - Continuously reviewing warning and flood information products.
 - Consulting with affected communities, key stakeholders, Dam Safety NSW and the NSW and ACT Flood Warning Consultative Committee, and maintains Operational Readiness.

- Participating in the development of public information and warning systems.
- h. Gauge owners adequately maintain flood warning gauges and systems, including those identified in the 'Service Level Specification' maintained by the Bureau of Meteorology (Bureau) and those identified in the 'Provision and Requirements for Flood Warning in New South Wales' maintained by NSW SES.

4.5 BRIEFING, TRAINING AND EXERCISING

4.5.1 **Strategy**: Ensure NSW SES, supporting agencies, functional areas and the community are prepared and familiar with the strategies and arrangements within the Flood Emergency Sub Plan and supporting documents.

Actions:

- a. NSW SES will consult stakeholders throughout the development of plans.
- b. NSW SES will inform stakeholders of content changes after revisions.
- c. NSW SES will ensure their facilities and resources are maintained and operationally ready.
- d. NSW SES will train personnel for their expected flood operation roles.
- e. NSW SES will regularly brief stakeholders on the exercise arrangements contained in the NSW Flood Emergency Sub Plan.

4.6 COMMUNITY RESILIENCE TO FLOODING

4.6.1 **Strategy**: NSW SES provides and maintains a flexible volunteer workforce to support community resilience.

Actions:

- a. Ensure ongoing recruitment and training of a diverse range of volunteers.
- b. Ensure pre-planning to facilitate the management of spontaneous volunteers and community members during a flood.
- 4.6.2 **Strategy**: NSW SES works with individuals, communities, businesses and government agencies to build flood resilience.

- a. Partner with and engage communities to understand and manage the risks associated with floods, including providing business continuity guidance (NSW SES Business FloodSafe), family preparedness (NSW SES Home FloodSafe) and other engagement strategies.
- b. Collate, assess and disseminate flood information to the community.
- c. Collaborate with individuals, businesses, government agencies and communities when developing flood intelligence, preparedness and response information.
- d. Plan for floods collaboratively with communities through community and stakeholder participation and engagement.

e. Collaborate with community sector and recognise the needs of individuals within communities who have an increased susceptibility during floods.

5 **RESPONSE**

5.1 INTRODUCTION

- 5.1.1 Flood response operations will begin:
 - a. On receipt of a Bureau Severe Weather Warning or Thunderstorm Warning that includes heavy rain or storm surge; or
 - b. On the receipt of a Bureau Flood Watch or Flood Warning; or
 - c. On receipt of warnings for flash flood; or
 - d. On receipt of a dam failure alert; or
 - e. When other evidence leads to an expectation of flooding.

5.2 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

5.2.1 **Strategy**: Maintain effective control of flood operations across NSW.

Actions:

- a. NSW SES uses the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) to manage the flood response.
- b. Control of flood response will be at the lowest effective level and may be scaled to suit the incident.
- c. The NSW SES State Controller (or delegate) will appoint Incident Controllers and establish Incident Control Centres (see NSW SES facilities on map in Appendix A).
- d. The NSW SES Incident Controller, in consultation with participating supporting emergency services and functional areas will determine the appropriate breakdown of an Area of Operations into Divisions and/or Sectors in accordance with the principles of AIIMS.

5.2.2 **Strategy**: Maintain Incident Control Centre(s).

- a. NSW SES will operate Incident Control Centre(s) as required.
- b. The NSW SES Incident Control Centre(s) will:
 - Control resources from NSW SES and coordinate resources of supporting emergency services and functional areas.
 - Manage Request for Assistance (RFA) tasking and ensure they are actioned in a timely manner.
 - Undertake response planning and determine future resourcing requirements.

- Coordinate information flow, including warnings, public information and social media.
- 5.2.3 **Strategy**: Provide effective liaison between NSW SES and supporting agencies or functional areas in accordance with Local EMPLAN.

Actions:

- a. Supporting emergency services and functional areas should provide Liaison Officers to NSW SES Incident Control Centre(s) and/or Emergency Operation Centres as required.
- b. NSW SES will provide Liaison Officer(s) to Emergency Operations Centres as required.
- c. Where possible Emergency Operation Centres to be co-located with NSW SES Incident Control Centres for Flood Emergency Response.
- 5.2.4 **Strategy**: Coordinate resources and logistics support to ensure operational effectiveness.

Actions:

- a. The NSW SES Incident Controller will notify agencies of potential access issues between locations, for the consideration of pre-deploying of resources.
- b. NSW SES may request resources and logistics support directly from a supporting emergency service or functional area.
- c. Wherever possible, supporting organisations are to provide their own logistic support in consultation with NSW SES where appropriate.
- d. The NSW SES Incident Controller will control air support operations and may utilise supporting agencies in the management of aircraft.

5.3 USE OF INFORMATION AND COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE

5.3.1 **Strategy**: Ensure flood information is effectively utilised, communicated and collected during and after a flood.

- a. Information relating to the consequences of flooding, response strategies, situational awareness and operational updates will be distributed by NSW SES to supporting emergency services and functional areas listed under this Plan.
- b. All supporting emergency services, functional areas and Council will accurately record and report information relevant to their activities and any real time flood information (including road closure information) to the NSW SES Incident Controller. This may be in the form of a combined Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) report, or direct from agencies where an EOC has not been established.
- c. NSW SES may establish and operate a Joint Intelligence Unit to coordinate the collection, collation, interpretation, mapping, actioning and dissemination of information.

- d. Reconnaissance, mapping, damage assessments, intelligence validation and post flood evaluation will be coordinated by NSW SES. This may occur post impact and continue into the recovery phase.
- e. NSW SES may request Engineering to assist with the gathering of flood intelligence including (not limited to) maximum flood extents, peak flood heights, recording major flood damage at key high velocity locations and preparation of After-Flood Report.
- 5.3.2 **Strategy**: Ensure flood intelligence is incorporated into operational decision- making.

Action: NSW SES will use flood intelligence, official forecasts, warnings, and flood scenario products to undertake an assessment of the predicted impact of a flood and to inform operational decision-making.

5.4 **PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND WARNINGS TO THE COMMUNITY**

5.4.1 **Strategy**: Timely and effective warnings are distributed to the community.

- a. The Bureau issues public weather and flood warning products before and during a flood. These may include:
 - Severe Thunderstorm Warnings Detailed issued for all capital cities and surrounding areas when individual severe thunderstorms are within range of the capital city radars.
 - Severe Thunderstorm Warnings Broad-based issued for the entire Australian State or territories affected highlighting broad areas where severe storms may occur within the next 3 hours.
 - Severe Weather Warnings with reference to heavy rainfall and/or storm surge.
 - Flood Watches.
 - Flood Warnings.
- b. Dam Owners will utilise the Dam Emergency Plan to provide warnings and information to NSW SES and communities (where appropriate).
- c. NSW SES Incident Controllers will issue the following NSW SES Flood Warnings aligning to the Australian Warning System:
 - Advice.
 - Watch And Act.
 - Emergency Warning.
- d. NSW SES liaises with the Bureau to discuss the development of flood warnings as required.
- e. NSW SES provides alerts and deliver flood information to affected communities using a combination of public information.
- f. NSW SES may request supporting agencies redistribute NSW SES alerts and information, including through the provision of doorknocking teams.

- g. Road closure information will be provided to the community through the following agencies/methods:
 - Local Government Council websites.
 - Transport for NSW 'Live Traffic' website: https://www.livetraffic.com/ or 'Transport InfoLine': 131 500. VMS messaging on roadways may also be used to advise motorists.
- h. The Public Information and Inquiry Centre will be established by NSW Police Force where required to provide information regarding evacuees and emergency information. Contact details will be broadcast once the centre is established.
- i. The Disaster Welfare Assistance Line will be established by Disaster Welfare Services where required to provide information on welfare services and assistance. Assistance line contact details will be broadcast once Disaster Welfare Services commence.

5.5 **PROTECTION OF PROPERTY**

5.5.1 **Strategy**: Coordinate the protection of property from destruction or damage arising from floods.

Action: NSW SES, supporting agencies, and community volunteers will assist the community (where resources are available, feasible and safe to do so) in:

- a. The protection of properties including critical infrastructure through flood protection systems (e.g. sandbagging) to minimise entry of water into buildings.
- b. The raising or moving of household furniture and commercial stock/equipment.

5.6 ROAD AND TRAFFIC CONTROL

5.6.1 **Strategy**: Coordinate the closing and re-opening of flood affected roads.

- a. Kyogle Council will coordinate the closure and reopening of council managed roads once inspections have been carried out by the relevant authority.
- b. Transport for NSW will coordinate the closure and reopening of the state road network.
- c. NSW Police Force may close and re-open roads but will normally only do so (if the Kyogle Council or Transport for NSW have not already acted and if public safety requires such action.
- d. NSW SES will assist with erecting road closure signs and barriers when time and resources permit.
- 5.6.2 **Strategy**: Coordinate traffic control measures in flood affected areas.
 - a. The NSW SES Incident Controller may direct the imposition of traffic control measures into flood affected areas in accordance with the provisions of the

State Emergency Service Act, 1989 and the State Emergency Rescue Management Act, 1989.

b. The NSW SES Incident Controller may request the Local Emergency Operations Controller provide suitable personnel to assist with traffic coordination.

5.7 **PROTECTION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES**

- 5.7.1 Arrangements for the protection of local assets are outlined in the NSW SES local Flood Emergency Sub Plan. In addition, Local and Region EMPLAN's contain infrastructure inventories.
- 5.7.2 **Strategy**: Minimise disruption to the community by ensuring protection of infrastructure and supply of essential energy, utility services and lifelines.

Actions:

- a. Transport Services Functional Area is to coordinate the provision of information about the assessment and restoration of transport network infrastructure.
- b. Energy and Utility Services Functional Area is to coordinate the assessment and restoration of essential energy and utility services (not including telecommunications).
- c. Telecommunications Services Functional Area is to coordinate the assessment and restoration of telecommunications and the Public Safety Network.
- d. Engineering Services Functional Area is to:
 - Coordinate the assessment and restoration of critical public buildings for example hospitals.
 - Assessment and operation of flood protection levees.
 - Protection of property.
 - Construction and repair of levees.
 - Dam safety assessment and dam stability.
 - Water supply and sewerage operations.
 - Other critical infrastructure.
- e. Functional Areas and Council will keep NSW SES informed of the status of utilities and infrastructure.

5.8 EVACUATION

- 5.8.1 Evacuation is NSW SES's primary response strategy for managing the population at risk of flooding.
- 5.8.2 **Strategy**: Conduct planning to ensure all evacuation constraints are considered.

- a. Evacuations will take place when there is a risk to public safety. Circumstances may include:
 - Evacuation of people when their homes or businesses are likely to flood.

- Evacuation of people who are unsuited to living in isolated circumstances, due to flood water closing access.
- Evacuation of people where essential energy and/or utility services are likely to fail or where buildings have been or may be made uninhabitable.
- b. NSW SES will consider the following in evacuation decisions:
 - Duration of evacuation.
 - Characteristics of the community.
 - Numbers requiring evacuation.
 - Availability of evacuation routes and transport.
 - The ability for existing levees or other flood protection works to fulfil their intended function.
 - Time available for evacuation.
 - Evacuee management requirements.
 - Resources and delivery of evacuation information.
 - Length of isolation.
- c. NSW SES Incident Controllers, planning and intelligence officers will carefully consider the risks involved in conducting evacuations.
- d. All evacuation decisions will be made as per the current NSW SES policies and procedures, and consistent with the NSW Evacuation Management Guidelines.
- e. Potential Evacuation Centres are located in the local EMPLAN.
- f. NSW Police Force will coordinate the provision of overall security for evacuated areas.
- 5.8.3 **Strategy**: Evacuate people pre-emptively from dangerous or potentially dangerous places and or locations created by the flood hazard to safe locations away from the hazard.
 - a. NSW SES will control and coordinate the evacuation of affected communities.
 - b. The NSW SES Commissioner (or delegate) will warn communities to prepare for a possible evacuation, where circumstances allow such lead time.
 - c. The NSW SES Commissioner (or delegate) will order any necessary evacuations and provide information to the community about when and how to evacuate.
 - d. Support to evacuation operations may be requested from other emergency services and supporting agencies using arrangements in the local EMPLAN and supporting plans.
 - e. Health Services Functional Area will coordinate the evacuation of hospitals, and assist where appropriate with health centres and aged care facilities (including nursing homes) in consultation with NSW SES and Welfare Services and ensure that appropriate business continuity plans are developed for essential health infrastructure and are activated during the floods as per the NSW Health Services Supporting Plan (HEALTH PLAN, 2013).

In the event of an emergency impact of any magnitude or type affecting a Residential Aged Care Facility or private hospital facility, the decision making and resolution regarding the requirement to evacuate will be the responsibility of the facility management in consultation with the relevant combat agency.

- f. School administration offices (Government and Private) will coordinate the evacuation of schools in consultation with NSW SES and Welfare Services, if not already closed.
- g. Caravan Park proprietors will inform the NSW SES Incident Controller when caravan park evacuations have been completed.
- h. People who are reluctant or refuse to comply with any Emergency Warning will be referred to NSW Police Force.

5.9 EVACUEE MANAGEMENT AND WELFARE

- 5.9.1 Research and experience in flood operations shows that most evacuees go to family, friends and commercial accommodation outside the impact area.
- 5.9.2 **Strategy**: Maintain the welfare of communities and individuals affected by the impact of a flood.

- NSW SES will provide initial welfare for evacuees where required but will hand the responsibility over to Welfare Services Functional Area as soon as possible.
 NSW SES will brief Welfare Services Functional Area at the earliest opportunity regarding the level of assistance required.
- b. Welfare Services Functional Area will manage evacuation centres for affected residents and travellers in accordance with Welfare Services Functional Area Supporting Plan.
- c. Schools Administration (Government and Private) will manage the safety of students directly affected by flooding and will work with NSW SES in the temporary closure of schools and will coordinate with NSW SES, Transport and Welfare Services in the management of school evacuees.
- d. Disaster Victim Registration will be controlled and coordinated by NSW Police Force with the assistance of NSW SES and the Welfare Services Functional Area.
- e. NSW SES will provide details of all residents assisted in evacuations to the Welfare Services Functional Area as early as possible.
- f. Where the expected remaining number of evacuees and the duration of evacuation is assessed to be beyond the capability and capacity of the established evacuation centre arrangements the SEOCON may establish Major Evacuation Centres or Mass Care facilities.
- g. The decision to establish Major Evacuation Centres or Mass Care Facilities will be made by NSW SES and SEOCON in consultation with members of the State Emergency Management Committee.
- 5.9.3 **Strategy**: Coordinate available and accessible health services for flood affected communities.

Action: The provision of environmental health advice, assessment of public health risks and coordination of immediate mental health support will be provided by Health Services Functional Area.

5.9.4 **Strategy**: Maintain the welfare of animals impacted by a flood.

Actions:

- a. Agriculture and Animal Services Functional Area will coordinate the welfare of livestock, pets, companion animals and wildlife including support to primary producers, animal holding establishments and community members.
- b. Agriculture and Animal Services Functional Area role will coordinate the evacuation, emergency care of animals and assessment, humane destruction and disposal of affected animals, and supply of emergency fodder, water and aerial support where necessary.

5.10 FLOOD RESCUE

5.10.1 **Strategy**: Control and coordinate flood rescue of people and domestic animals.

Actions:

- a. NSW SES will perform flood rescue, where training and equipment is suitable and where a risk assessment has indicated that the risk to rescuers is acceptable.
- b. Flood rescue operations will be conducted in accordance with the State Rescue Board NSW State Rescue Policy which sets out the framework, governance, responsibilities and requirements for the management and conduct of flood rescue in NSW.
- c. NSW SES may request other supporting emergency services to undertake flood rescues on behalf of NSW SES. Agencies must be authorised/accredited to undertake flood rescue operations in accordance with State Rescue Board requirements, as prescribed by NSW SES. Supporting emergency services must supply information regarding rescues performed to NSW SES. Notification arrangements with NSW Police Force are outlined in the State Rescue Board NSW State Rescue Policy.
- d. Rescue agencies will conduct rescue of domestic small and large animals as per the State Rescue Board NSW State Rescue Policy (and may include Large Animal Rescue of family horses and cows at a residence or property). The rescue of livestock (which includes commercial animals found on farming and breeding enterprises) will be coordinated through Animal and Agriculture Services Functional Area.

5.11 RESUPPLY

5.11.1 **Strategy**: Coordinate resupply to towns and villages isolated by flooding to minimise disruption to the community.

- a. NSW SES will advise communities and businesses if flood predictions indicate that areas are likely to become isolated, and indicative timeframes where possible.
- b. Retailers should be advised to ensure sufficient stock is available for the duration of the flood.
- c. When isolation occurs, NSW SES will establish loading points where retailers can instruct suppliers to deliver goods.
- d. NSW SES will endeavour to support the delivery of mail to isolated communities but may not be able to do so according to normal Australia Post timetables.
- e. NSW SES will assist hospitals with resupply of linen and other consumables where able.
- f. NSW SES may request resupply assistance from supporting agencies.
- g. NSW SES may conduct resupply operations as per the designated resupply plan for the event.
- h. Where additional supplies are required Engineering Services Functional Area be requested to coordinate the supply of goods and services in response to and recovery from the emergency.
- 5.11.2 **Strategy**: Coordinate resupply to rural properties isolated by flooding.

Actions:

- a. When requested, NSW SES will establish a resupply schedule and coordinate the resupply for isolated rural properties.
- b. NSW SES will provide local suppliers with designated loading points. Resupply items are to be packaged by the supplier.
- c. Isolated households unable to afford resupply items will be referred to Welfare Services Functional Area for assistance.

5.12 RETURN

5.12.1 **Strategy**: Coordinate the safe return of communities to flood affected areas when the immediate danger to life and property has passed.

- a. The NSW SES Incident Controller will determine when it is safe to progressively return in consultation with the relevant Emergency Operations Controller and supporting agencies considering the ongoing risk to public safety.
- b. The NSW SES Incident Controller will specify the level of access to affected communities as the following:
 - Not suitable for access; or
 - Limited access by emergency services and response agencies; or
 - Limited access by residents and/or business operators; or
 - Full access.

- c. The NSW SES Incident Controller will issue an Advice Warning advising 'Reduced Threat: Return with Caution' when the immediate danger to life and property has passed for areas.
- d. NSW SES will facilitate the return of evacuees to their homes.

5.13 END OF RESPONSE OPERATIONS

5.13.1 **Strategy**: Conclude response operations.

Actions:

- a. Response operations will conclude when:
 - There is a reduced likelihood of additional flooding within the Area of Operation and flood waters have receded.
 - All requests for assistance related to the flood have been completed.
 - The need for warning and evacuation no longer exist.
 - There is no further likelihood of rescuing people.
 - Resupply is no longer required (resupply operations may occur concurrently with the recovery phase).
 - Response to fire and hazardous material incidents have concluded (not including subsequent clean-up of contaminated sites).
 - All affected areas have had a 'Reduced Threat: Return with Caution' issued.

5.14 POST IMPACT ACTIONS

- 5.14.1 **Strategy**: Learnings from the event are used to inform recovery and future events. **Actions**:
 - a. NSW SES will continue to engage with communities after significant floods through convening one or more community forums, workshops or other opportunities to provide communities a chance to provide feedback, address any concerns and provide input into the recovery process. These will typically include other agencies such as the Bureau, Welfare Services and Kyogle Council representatives.
 - b. NSW SES will conduct After Action Reviews, at the conclusion of response operations, which will involve all stakeholders. Findings will be shared and incorporated into improved disaster resilience planning.
 - c. NSW SES will provide information and data throughout the emergency response to inform community recovery. A report will be developed at the request of the SERCON at the conclusion of the response within an area. Should a response summary report be required it will include the following:
 - The emergency action plan in place at conclusion of the response emphasising any continuing activities including community meetings/ engagement activities.

- Resources allocated to the emergency response and associated exit strategies.
- Details of any areas or situations with potential to re-escalate the emergency.
- A recommendation for the conclusion of NSW SES as lead agency to transition to NSW Reconstruction Authority as the lead agency for Recovery.
- Any actions that are incomplete or outstanding.
- Damage Assessment Data and Information obtained throughout the response phase which will further support the long-term recovery of communities.

d. NSW SES will undertake/coordinate a comprehensive review of intelligence and plans following significant flood events.

5.14.2 **Strategy:** Participate in post flood data collection analysis.

Actions: NSW SES works with relevant stakeholders and Kyogle Council Council(s) on post flood data collection analysis including review of flood intelligence where necessary.

6 **RECOVERY OPERATIONS**

6.1 INTRODUCTION

- 6.1.1 Recovery is the process of returning an affected community to its proper level of functioning after an emergency. It will generally commence simultaneously with the Response phase.
- 6.1.2 Recovery operations will be initiated and conducted as outlined in the NSW State EMPLAN and as further detailed in the NSW Recovery Supporting Plan.

6.2 NSW SES RECOVERY ROLE

6.2.1 **Strategy**: NSW SES will support recovery operations and established Recovery Committees.

6.2.2 **Actions**:

- a. NSW SES will provide representation to Recovery Committees as required and may have an ongoing role in the Recovery phase.
- b. NSW SES roles on Recovery Committees may include providing information about any continuing response, guidance on mitigation strategies and general advice and assistance to the committee as a subject matter specialist and/ or expert.
- c. NSW SES will provide information to NSW Reconstruction Authority to support applications to Treasury for Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements.

- d. NSW SES, in conjunction with a Recovery Committee, will provide a service to support the information needs of a community immediately following a flood.
- e. NSW SES and where required supporting agencies will assist with clean-up operations after floods, where possible when resources and personnel permit.
- f. NSW SES may coordinate immediate relief in collaboration with SEOCON and SERCON.

7 ABBREVIATIONS

For a full list of abbreviations refer to the NSW State Flood Plan - Abbreviations

8 GLOSSARY

Common emergency service terminology can be found within the Australian Disaster Resilience Glossary.

Readers should refer to EMPLAN Annex 9 – Definitions.

Refer to the NSW State Flood Plan for a complete glossary of terminology used throughout this plan and within NSW SES Flood Plans.

For a full list of definitions refer to the Supporting Document - State Flood Plan Glossary https://www.ses.nsw.gov.au/media/2650/glossary.pdf





10 Appendix B – Roles and Responsibilities

AGENCY	RESPONSIBILITIES
NSW State Emergency Service	NSW SES is the designated Combat Agency for floods, storms and tsunami and controls response operations. NSW SES roles and responsibilities in relation to floods are outlined in the <u>NSW State Flood Emergency Sub Plan</u> .

AGENCY	RESPONSIBILITIES
Agriculture and Animal Services Functional Area	The roles and responsibilities for Agriculture and Animal Services are outlined in the Agriculture and Animal Services Supporting Plan and NSW State Flood Plan.
Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology	The roles and responsibilities for the Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology (Bureau) are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Kyogle Council	Preparedness
	• Establish and maintain floodplain and risk management committees and ensure that key agencies are represented.
	• Develop and implement floodplain risk management plans in accordance with the NSW Government's Flood Prone Land Policy and the Flood Risk Management Manual.
	• Provide levee studies, flood studies and floodplain management studies to NSW SES.
	• Maintain a Dam Emergency Plan for the Petrochilos Dam and provide copies to NSW SES.
	• Provide information on the consequences of dam failure to NSW SES for incorporation into planning and flood intelligence.
	• Maintain council-owned flood warning networks and flood mitigation works.
	• Participate in NSW SES-led flood emergency planning meetings, to assist in the preparation of Flood Sub Plans.
	• Maintain a plant and equipment resource list for the council area.
	Contribute to community engagement activities.
	Response
	• Subject to the availability of council resources, assist NSW SES with flood operations including:
	 Traffic management on council managed roads. Provision of assistance to NSW SES (plant, equipment and personnel where able and requested).

AGENCY	RESPONSIBILITIES	
	 Property protection tasks including sandbagging. Assist with the removal of caravans from caravan parks. Warning and/or evacuation of residents and other people in flood liable areas. Provision of back-up radio communications. Resupply of isolated properties. Technical advice on the impacts of flooding. Close and reopen council roads (and other roads nominated by agreement with Transport for NSW) and advise NSW SES, NSW Police Force and people who contact the council for road information. Assist NSW SES to provide filled sandbags and filling facilities to residents and business in areas which flooding is expected. 	
	 Assist with making facilities available for domestic pets and companion animals of evacuees during evacuations. 	
	• Operate flood mitigation works including critica I structures such as detention basins and levees and advise NSW SES regarding their operation.	
	• Manage and protect council-owned infrastructure facilities during floods.	
	 Provide advice to NSW SES and the Health Services Functional Area during floods about key council managed infrastructure such as sewerage treatment and water supply. 	
	 Advise the Environmental Protection Authority of any sewerage overflow caused by flooding. 	
	 Work with NSW SES and NSW Department of Planning and Environment to collect flood related data during and after flood events. 	
	Recovery	
	 Provide for the management of health hazards associated with flooding including removing debris and waste. 	
	 Ensure premises are fit and safe for reoccupation and assess any need for demolition. 	
	 Provide services, assistance and advice to State Government in accordance with the State Recovery Plan. 	
Caravan Park Proprietor(s)	• Ensure that owners and occupiers of movable dwellings are aware that the caravan park is flood liable by providing a written notice to occupiers taking up residence and displaying this notice and emergency management arrangement within the park.	
	• Ensure that owners and occupiers of movable dwellings are aware that if they are expecting to be absent for extended periods, they should:	

AGENCY	RESPONSIBILITIES	
	 Provide the manager of the caravan park with a contact address and telephone number in case of an emergency. Leave any movable dwelling in a condition allowing it to be relocated in an emergency (i.e.: should ensure that the wheels, axles and draw bar of the caravans are not removed and are maintained in proper working order). 	
	• Ensure that occupiers are informed of Flood Information. At this time, occupiers should be advised to:	
	 Ensure that they have spare batteries for their radios. Listen to a local radio station for updated flood information. Prepare for evacuation and movable dwelling (cabins) relocation. 	
	• Ensure that owners and occupiers of caravans are aware of what they must do to facilitate evacuation and movable dwelling relocation when flooding occurs.	
	• Coordinate the evacuation of people and the relocation of movable dwellings when floods are rising and their return when flood waters have subsided. Movable dwellings will be relocated back to the caravan park(s) by owners or by vehicles and drivers arranged by the park managers.	
	• Secure any movable dwellings that are not able to be relocated to prevent floatation.	
	 Inform NSW SES of the progress of evacuation and/or movable dwellings relocation operations and of any need for assistance in the conduct of these tasks. 	
Childcare Centres and Preschools	When notified of possible flooding or isolation, childcare centres and preschools should.	
	 Liaise with NSW SES and arrange for the early release of children whose travel arrangements are likely to be disrupted by flooding and/or road closures. Assist with coordinating the evacuation of preschools and childcare centres. 	
Dams Safety NSW	The roles and responsibilities for Dams Safety NSW (formerly NSW Dam Safety Committee) are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.	
Department of Defence	Arrangements for Defence Assistance to the Civil Community are detailed within the State EMPLAN (section 448).	
Energy and Utilities Services Functional Area	The roles and responsibilities for Energy and Utilities Services are outlined in the Energy and Utility Services Supporting Plan (EUSPLAN).	
	Koles and responsibilities in addition to the Supporting Plan are:	

AGENCY	RESPONSIBILITIES
	• Assist NSW SES with identification of infrastructure at risk of flood damage where resources are available.
	• Facilitate local utility service distribution providers (electricity, gas, water, wastewater) to:
	 Provide advice to NSW SES of any need to disconnect power/gas/water/wastewater supplies or of any timetable for reconnection. Advise NSW SES of any hazards from utility services during flooding and inundation. Advise the public with regard to electrical hazards during flooding and inundation, and to the availability or otherwise of the electricity supply. Clear or make safe any hazard caused by power lines or electricity distribution equipment. Reconnect customers' electrical / gas / water / wastewater installations, when certified safe to do so and as conditions allow. Assist NSW SES to identify infrastructure at r isk of flooding for incorporation into planning and intelligence.
Engineering Services	The roles and responsibilities for Engineering Services are outlined in the
Functional Area	Engineering Services Supporting Plan and NSW State Flood Plan.
Environmental Services Functional Area	The roles and responsibilities for Environmental Services are outlined in the Environmental Services (ENVIROPLAN) Supporting Plan.
Floodplain Management Australia	The roles and responsibilities for Floodplain Management Australia are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Fire and Rescue NSW	The roles and responsibilities for Fire and Rescue NSW are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Forestry Corporation of NSW	The roles and responsibilities for Forestry Corporation of NSW are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Health Services Functional Area	The roles and responsibilities for Health Services are outlined in the Health Services (HEALTHPLAN) Supporting Plan and NSW State Flood Plan.
Local Emergency Operations	Monitor flood operations.
Controller (LEOCON)	• If requested, coordinate support for the NSW SES Incident Controller.
Local Emergency Management Officer (LEMO)	• If requested by the NSW SES Incident Controller, advise appropriate agencies and officers of the start of response operations.
Manly Hydraulics Laboratory (MHL)	The roles and responsibilities for Manly Hydraulic Laboratory are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Marine Rescue NSW	The roles and responsibilities for Marine Rescue NSW are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.

AGENCY	RESPONSIBILITIES
NSW Ambulance	The roles and responsibilities for NSW Ambulance are outlined in the Health Services (HEALTHPLAN) Supporting Plan and NSW State Flood Plan.
NSW Department of Education, Association of Independent Schools of NSW, and National Catholic Education Commission	The roles and responsibilities for NSW Department of Education, Association of Independent Schools of NSW, and National Catholic Education Commission are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
NSW Department of Planning and Environment (Environment and Heritage Group)	The roles and responsibilities for NSW Department of Planning and Environment (Environment and Heritage Group) are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan (referred to as DPIE EES).
NSW Department of Planning and Environment (Water)	The roles and responsibilities for NSW Department of Planning and Environment (Water) are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
NSW Food Authority	The roles and responsibilities for NSW Food Authority are outlined in the Food Safety Emergency Sub Plan.
NSW National Parks and	The roles and responsibilities for NSW National Parks and Wildlife Services
	are outlined in the NSW state Flood Plan.
NSW Police Force	State Flood Plan.
NSW Rural Fire Service	The roles and responsibilities for NSW Rural Fire Service are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Owners of Declared Dams within or upstream of the LGA	The roles and responsibilities for Owners of Declared Dams are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Public Information Services Functional Area	The roles and responsibilities for Public Information Services are outlined in the Public Information Services Supporting Plan and NSW State Flood. Plan.
NSW Reconstruction Authority	The roles and responsibilities for NSW Reconstruction Authority are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
SEOCON/SEOC	The roles and responsibilities for the SEOCON/SEOC are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Surf Life Saving NSW	The roles and responsibilities for Surf Life Saving NSW are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.
Telecommunications Services Functional Area	The roles and responsibilities for Telecommunications Services are outlined in the Telecommunications Services (TELCOPLAN) Supporting Plan.

AGENCY	RESPONSIBILITIES	
Transport for NSW (TfNSW)	• Transport for NSW (TfNSW) coordinates information on road conditions for emergency services access.	
	 Transport for NSW (TfNSW) coordinates the management of the road network across all modes of transport. 	
	• Transport for NSW (TfNSW) in conjunction will assist NSW SES with the evacuation of at-risk communities by maintaining access and egress routes.	
	 Assist NSW SES with the communication of flood warnings and information provision to the public through Live Traffic and Social Media according to the VMS protocols and procedur es. 	
	• Assist NSW SES with identification of road infrastructure at risk of flooding.	
Transport Services	The roles and responsibilities for Transport Services are outlined in the	
Functional Area	Transport Services Functional Area Supporting Plan and NSW State Flood Plan.	
VRA Rescue NSW	The roles and responsibilities for VRA Rescue NSW are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.	
Water NSW	The roles and responsibilities for Water NSW are outlined in the NSW State Flood Plan.	
Welfare Services Functional	The roles and responsibilities for Welfare Services are outlined in the	
Area	Welfare Services Functional Area Supporting Plan and NSW State Flood Plan.	

11 Appendix C – Community Specific Roles and Responsibilities

Community Members	Preparedness
	 Understand the potential risk and impact of flooding.
	• Prepare homes and property to reduce the impact of flooding.
	 Understand warnings and other triggers for action and the safest actions to take in a flood.
	 Households, institutions and businesses develop plans to manage flood risks, sharing and practicing this with family, friends, employees and neighbours.
	Have an emergency kit.
	Be involved in local emergency planning processes.
	Recovery
	Assist with community clean-up if required and able to do so.
	Participate in After Action Reviews if required.
Aboriginal	 Act as the point of contact between NSW SES and the Bundjalung
organisations or	community.
groups	 Disseminate flood information, including flood and evacuation warnings, to the Bundjalung community.



HAZARD AND RISK IN KYOGLE

Volume 2 of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan

Last Update: November 2023



AUTHORISATION

The Hazard and Risk in the Kyogle Council has been prepared by the NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES) as part of a comprehensive planning process. The information contained herein has been compiled from the latest available technical studies.

Approved

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21 November 2023

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Description	Date
Kyogle Local Flood Plan	March 1994

AMENDMENT LIST

Suggestions for amendments to this Volume should be forwarded to:

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Amendments promulgated in the amendments list below have been entered in this Volume.

Amendment Number	Description	Updated by	Date

Document Issue: Version 3-02052016

1 THE FLOOD THREAT

1.1 OVERVIEW

- The Kyogle Council Local Government Area (LGA) includes the township of Kyogle and the villages of Tabulam, Wiangaree, Woodenbong, Bonalbo and Old Bonalbo, The Border Ranges National Park, State Forests and surrounding rural areas (1).
- b. For operational purposes, the area includes the Urbenville township and the rural areas of Koreelah and Beaury Creek which are located within the Tenterfield Shire Council LGA (1).
- c. It has a population of 9359, with approximately 26% of its population aged 65 and over and 5.6% of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin (2).
- d. The urban centre of Kyogle and other main villages (Bonalbo, Tabulam, Woodenbong, Urbenville, Mallanganee, Mummulgum, Old Bonalbo, Grevillia and Wiangaree) contain approximately 41% of the population. The majority of the population, approximately 59%, live rurally (3).
- e. The Kyogle LGA spans the upper reaches of both the Clarence and Richmond River basins (1).

1.2 LANDFORMS AND RIVER SYSTEMS

Richmond River Basin

- a. Kyogle is situated at the confluence of the Richmond River and Fawcetts Creek within the Richmond River Valley of New South Wales. The Richmond River flows in a general south-easterly direction from its source on the Queensland/New South Wales border in the McPherson Ranges. Fawcetts Creek is an easterly tributary comprising 129.1km² of the 886.2km² total catchment area upstream of Kyogle.
- b. The Richmond River is initially a series of steep mountain streams, which combine forming a major flow path at Wiangaree. Downstream of Wiangaree bed slopes decrease, the floodplain becomes a flow path at Wiangaree. Downstream of Wiangaree bed slopes decrease, the floodplain becomes more pronounced and the river exhibits meandering patterns. It is not until downstream of Kyogle township that major floodplains start to develop. Fawcetts Creek has a similar terrain profile.
- c. The major urban areas of the Kyogle Township are located on higher ground to the south-east of the confluence of the watercourses. The suburb of Geneva, located on the western side of the Richmond River, is also mostly on higher ground. However, a considerable number of properties in the area known as 'The Flats', which is bounded to the north by Fawcetts Creek and to the west by the Richmond River, are located on flood prone land. Properties along the western side of Fawcett St in the north of Kyogle are also subject to flooding (4).

Clarence River Basin

Peacock Creek and George Creek Catchments

- a. Upstream of the Clarence Way Bridge at Bonalbo, Peacock Creek has a catchment area of 121 km². The catchment comprises two large catchments of Peacock Creek and Gorge Creek which each have an area of about 105 m² to their confluence. A river gauge is located on Peacock Creek about 7 km upstream of the confluence and gauges a catchment area of about 48 km². The Gorge Creek catchment drains about 45 km².
- b. A number of smaller sub-catchments of Peacock Creek drain an area of about 5 km² through the town (5).

Tooloom Creek and Boomi Creek Catchments

- a. The Toolom Falls combined catchment area is 312.6 km². Their confluence is near Urbenville, where Tooloom Creek and Boomi Creek have catchment areas of approximately 170.9 km² and 114.8 km² respectively. Smaller sub-catchments drain through the towns.
- b. At Urbenville, an unnamed tributary flowing into Tooloom Creek flows southwest of the town draining a catchment area of about 2.3 km².
- c. At Woodenbong, a tributary flowing into Tooloom Creek, known as Black Gully flows east to west along the north side of the town. A smaller tributary of Black Gully flows through the town east of properties on Richmond Street. A levee was constructed in Richmond Street to provide some protect from flooding during minor flood events. Overland flows also occur within the town from stormwater runoff. The local catchment of Woodenbong is 8.4 km² and the catchment area of Tooloom Creek upstream of Woodenbong is 112 km² (6).

Little Creek Catchment

a. The Mallanganee township is located directly upstream of the Little Creek catchment which is a tributary of the much larger Clarence River. Mallanganee Township receives headwaters from mountain ranges on the western side of Mallanganee National Park and some small tributaries south of Bruxner Highway. The upstream catchment terminating at Deep Creek Road is approximately 8.8 km². The Bruxner Highway and Deep Creek Road form the key hydraulic controls for local overland flow. The current land use zoning within Mallanganee is residential and agricultural land use (7).

1.3 STORAGE DAMS

a. Dam locations are shown on River Basin Map 1 and River Basin Map 2.

Toonumbar Dam	(8)
Owner / Operator	Water NSW
Description of Dam	Toonumbar Dam is a 44 m high earth and rockfill embankment constructed to store water for the benefit of riparian users and the future development of irrigation by private pumping from the stream. Its spillway is an ungated concrete lined spillway chute with flip bucket.
Location	Toonumbar Dam is located on Iron Pot Creek, 20km west of Kyogle, in the Richmond River Basin.
Communities Downstream	Its downstream communities are Ettrick, Doubtful Creek, Dobies Bight, Casino, Ghinni Ghi.
	Key consequences of a dam break are increased levels in Iron Pot Creek and Richmond River.
Monitoring System	The monitoring systems are Hydraulic Piezometers, Seepage Points, Cross Arms, Pin Pairs, and Reservoir Level Gauge.
Warning System	WaterNSW will issue alerts to SES via SES State Operations.
Other	

 Table 1:
 Prescribed Dams in Kyogle LGA; summary of information about each storage.

Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam (9)		
Owner / Operator	Kyogle Council	
Description of Dam	Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam is an off-creek water storage for Bonalbo. Water is pumped from bores in Peacock Creek to Bonalbo Dam from where it is pumped via a chlorinator house to a concrete reservoir for distribution. It is a homogeneous earthfill embankment dam. The main embankment has a maximum height of 13.3m, a crest length of 140m and a crest width of 6m. There is an internal drainage system comprised of a partial blanket filter and a rock toe drain.	
	The Dam consists of a drop inlet and an emergency by-wash spillway on the right abutment. The reservoir has a storage capacity at FSL (RL 98.3m or 194.15m AHD) is 55ML and the catchment area is 16ha.	
Location	The dam is in Bonalbo, which is located on the Clarence Way approximately 24 kilometres north of the Bruxner Highway. The dam is located on the outskirts of Bonalbo approximately 0.5 kilometres north- west of the town. It lies within Kyogle Council and the Clarence River Basin.	
Communities Downstream	Approximately 31 houses would be inundated in downstream Bonalbo in a Sunny Day Failure, and 46 during a PMF and 51 in a PMF Dambreak.	
Monitoring System	Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam is monitored by a network of instrumentation comprising: Storage Level Manual Indicators, Storage Level Automatic Level, Standpipe, Piezometers, Seepage pipe outlet V- notch weir, Rain gauge. There are also routine visual inspections.	
Warning System	An automatic storage level recorder is installed at the dam with pre-set alert levels.	

	The Human Machine Interface (HMI) operates the automatic warning system for the water and sewerage systems in Bonalbo and Woodenbong. This includes the WTP and dam level monitoring
	site.
	The seepage weir system at Bonalbo Dam is not yet telemetered and is manually checked daily.
Other	

Two prescribed dams in Queensland, Maroon Dam (Gauge ID 40677) and Moogerah (Gauge ID 40135), located north and north-west of Woodenbong have been identified (6). No dam failure consequences for Woodenbong have been identified (10) (11).

1.4 WEATHER SYSTEMS AND FLOODING

- a. Flooding in Kyogle shows strong seasonality, with the majority of recorded floods occurring between December and March. This seasonality of flooding is the result of two distinct weather patterns; tropical cyclones and intense depressions close to the coast.
- b. In the early months of the year, tropical cyclones originating near the equator may move south. While it is rare for a cyclone to enter north-eastern New South Wales, those that approach southern Queensland, or which travel southwards past the coast of northern New South Wales may bring rain of sufficient intensity and duration to cause flooding. There are also occasions when a heavy rain area advances well ahead of the cyclone which may be 200 to 300 kilometres away.
- c. The most frequent origin of flooding rain events is the development of intense depressions close to the coast. Generally, these systems maintain a supply of deep moisture as they move southwards in proximity to the coast.
- d. These depressions may develop at any time, but the flood rain events are most likely during that part of the year when sea surface temperatures are high, and the air is humid. As tropical cyclones can also be expected at this time, most flood events in the Richmond and Clarence River catchments occur in the first half of the year.

Bonalbo

There is some variation in the rainfall Intensity-Frequency-Duration across the catchment. Higher intensity rainfalls are likely in the upper catchment areas where the steeper hillslopes are likely to have orographic effects on rainfall patterns.
 Rainfall at Bonalbo town is likely to be less intense than across other areas of the catchment (5).



Figure 1: Daily Rainfall Data Recorded at Bonalbo Post Office Gauge since 1950 (5)

Urbenville

Figure 2: Daily Rainfall Data Recorded at Urbenville Gauge (57020) since 1935 (6)



Woodenbong







Figure 4: Monthly Flood Distribution, Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002)

1.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF FLOODING

Richmond River Basin

- a. Within the upper reaches of the Richmond River catchment, flash flooding can occur at all tributaries upstream of Wiangaree and in the Fawcett's Plain area at Fawcetts Creek.
- b. Very little flooding occurs along the Richmond River itself until downstream of the township of Kyogle except in Wiangaree and Kyogle. Flooding in these upper reaches is of short duration, but quickly rising flood waters allow little warning time. Road closures and transport disruptions are the principal difficulties experienced.

Table 2: Indicative Flow Travel Time for the Richmond River

Locations	Travel Time
Wiangaree to Kyogle	6-8 hours

Clarence River Basin

- a. Within the upper reaches of the Clarence River catchment, flash flooding can occur in the Urbenville area at Tooloom Creek, the Old Bonalbo area at Bonalbo Creek and in the Bonalbo area at Peacock Creek (1).
- b. At Woodenbong, flooding is affected by local overland flows due to the terrain and Woodenbong sitting on a high point in comparison to Tooloom Creek. Overland flows join Black Gully which overtops Roseberry Street and affects properties to the south in severe events. This tributary then drains into Tooloom Creek. The local

catchment of Woodenbong is 8.4 km² and the catchment area of Tooloom Creek upstream of Woodenbong is 112 km².

c. At Urbenville, flooding is dominated by Tooloom Creek especially in the larger events. There is overland flow flooding throughout the town in smaller events and in the northeast of the town in larger events between Beaury Street and Stephen Street. The catchment of Tooloom Creek upstream of Urbenville is 170.9 km², the local catchment of Urbenville is 2.6 km², and the catchment of Boomi Creek which intersects with Tooloom Creek downstream of the Urbenville is 114.8 km² (6).

1.6 FLOOD HISTORY

Richmond River Basin

Kyogle

- a. During the major flood that occurred along the entire length of the Richmond River on the 20th of February 1954, 10 people lost their lives within Kyogle. Additionally, 10 houses were swept away and a further 159 homes were damaged by floodwaters. Since this time, flood events of a smaller magnitude have been experienced in 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1989, 1996, 2001 and 2008. The 2008 event represents the second largest flood on record (12). The 2022 flood reached a peak height of 17.86m making it the third largest flood on record (13), whilst the 2017 flood peaked at 17.39m (14).
- During the 2008 event, inundation of approximately 100 properties occurred.
 Fortunately, no lives were lost. This is possibly in part related to the timing of the event, which reached its peak level at midday on the 5th of January. The 2008 flood event highlighted the need for flood management in the Kyogle area (4).

Clarence River Basin

Bonalbo

- a. Major flooding affecting Bonalbo from Peacock Creek occurred in 1967; the event was estimated as about a 1% Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) event. Events in the 1950s washed away the Woodenbong Road / Clarence Way bridge crossing on Peacock Creek and damaged a replacement bridge. Other than these events, there has not been major flooding from Peacock Creek in recent years.
- Recent flooding has not been as significant as the events in the 1950s and 1960s.
 Following events in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2020, as well as others, flash flooding in streets was reported in local news and social media. Flash flooding has also been described in the community consultation responses.
- c. The summer months of December to March typically receive the highest rainfall. Flooding on Peacock Creek and some of the largest events (1954, 1976, 2008) have

all occurred during these summer months with the exception of the 1967 event which occurred in June (5).

d. In February 2022 a flood event occurred in Bonalbo with flooding reported by residents throughout the town. The peak occurred on 28 February and followed a period of prolonged rainfall over the course of the month. This was the second highest flood on record at 4.46m (12).

Date	Description	AEP estimate (if known)
1967		1% AEP (FFA)
	 Approximated as 2% AEP event (Kyogle Council based on Kyogle Flood Study) though data at Peacock Creek and Bonalbo Gauges, this was estimated as an approximate 5% AEP at Bonalbo. 	5% AEP (FFA and Bonalbo Post Office daily-read gauge)
lanuary	 Level of 166.930 m at Butter Factory and assumed level of 100.81 m at Preschool with about 400 mm of above floor flooding (Kyogle Council) 	
January 2008	 Bonalbo Hardware store on Sandilands Street affected by some 150 mm of floodwater (Northern Star, 29 December, 2010) 	
	 Mapped flood extent provided by Council shows flooding reaching the south side of Woodenbong Road / Clarence Way and inundated properties at the eastern end of Sandilands street east of Peacock Street and also properties on Capeen Street (refer Figure 3-3). 	
2010	 Council's prior clearing of a drain either side of Farm Road and through the golf course and bowling club successfully reduced flooding (Northern Star, 29 December, 2010) 	50% AEP
	Approximated as a 50% AEP	50% AEP
January 2020	300 mm depths at Woodenbong Road Bridge and Sandilands Street Bridge	
	Flooding over Farm Road	
	300 mm of water in front yard of 1A Sandliands Street	
Unknown	• 167.820 mAHD at Butter Factory (Kyogle Council)	

Table 3: Historic Flood Events in Bonalbo (5)

Tabulam

a. Significant flood events occurred in 1976 and 2011. During the 2011 event a number of houses and their occupants were evacuated as floodwaters peaked, resulting in the village being isolated for a period (13).

Urbenville and Woodenbong

a. In events such as December 2010, January 2011, January 2013, March 2016, March 2017 rising flood waters from Tooloom Creek cut of the road between Urbenville and Woodenbong resulting in isolation of residents.

- b. Damage to the road during flood events prolongs the period of closure. For example, following the January 2011 the road about 9 km south of Urbenville was severely damaged meaning the road had to be closed to traffic until it could be repaired.
- Recent flooding occurred in 2010, 2011 2013, 2016 and 2017. Although roads were cut and the villages isolated, no floor levels were reported as being inundated. However, elevated homes in the low-lying areas of Urbenville were surrounded by flood waters. These flood events were smaller and more frequent than a 20% AEP event on the Tooloom Creek catchment and larger flood events could occur.
- d. While a number of small floods have occurred in recent years, it has been some time since the Tooloom Creek catchment has suffered from a major flood. Flooding in 1950 and 1954 is thought to be some of the highest on record although there is limited available observed data. From rainfall gauges these events were estimated to be in the order of a 45% to 5% AEP rainfall event (6).

1.7 FLOOD MITIGATION SYSTEMS

- a. There are three levees within Kyogle LGA:
 - i. Kyogle Levee located to the north-west of McDougal St running north of McDougall St before running partially along Anzac Drive.
 - ii. Bonalbo Levee located parallel to Oak Street.
 - Woodenbong Levee located on Bonalbo Lane between Dalmorton Street and Unumgar Street.
- b. Each levee is further described within Part 2 Specific Risk Areas.
- c. There are no prescribed detention basins within Kyogle LGA.

1.8 EXTREME FLOODING

- a. The PMF flood in Kyogle LGA is likely to cause significant inundation in both towns and rural areas.
- b. The PMF flood is estimated to be 21.5m at the Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002) (14) and 26.65m at the Tabulam Gauge (202002-557000) (15).

2 EFFECTS ON THE COMMUNITY

2.1 COMMUNITY PROFILE

- **2.1.1** The Kyogle Council LGA is made up of a number of communities that can be affected in a flood. These can be classified into the following sectors:
 - 1. **Kyogle Sector** Kyogle, Geneva, Wiangaree
 - 2. Bonalbo Sector Bonalbo, Old Bonalbo, Tabulam, Mallanganee
 - 3. Urbenville Sector Urbenville, Woodenbong, Muli Muli

Table 4: Census of Housing and Population data (2021)

Census Description	Kyogle LGA	Kyogle Town	Wiangaree	Old Bonalbo
Total Persons	9359	2804	161	73
Aged 0-4 years	402	141	18	6
Aged 5-14 years	1084	382	16	12
Aged 65 + years	2491	856	47	24
Of Indigenous Origin	525	156	12	13
Who do not speak English well	18	9	0	0
Have a need for assistance (profound/severe disability)	697	236	6	3
Living alone (Total)	1209	423	12	11
Living alone (Aged 65+)	594	654	6	8
Residing in caravans, cabins or houseboats or improvised dwellings	64	19	0	0
Occupied Private Dwellings (Households)	3736	1147	54	33
No Motor Vehicle	138	82	4	0
Caravan, cabin, houseboat or improvised dwell	37	12	0	0
Rented via State or Housing Authority	39	0	0	0
Rented via Housing Co-Op or Community Church Group	16	0	0	0
Unoccupied Private Dwellings	559	104	9	10
Average persons per occupied dwelling	2.2	2.2	2.6	2
Average vehicles per occupied dwelling	1.9	1.6	2.4	1.6

Census Description	Bonalbo	Tabulam	Urbenville	Woodenbong
Total Persons	338	508	331	390
Aged 0-4 years	11	23	11	12
Aged 5-14 years	27	47	36	38
Aged 65 + years	103	107	112	128
Of Indigenous Origin	37	146	48	22
Who do not speak English well	0	0	0	0
Have a need for assistance (profound/severe disability)	54	39	50	34
Living alone (Total)	75	65	61	62
Living alone (Aged 65+)	32	27	24	32
Residing in caravans, cabins or houseboats or improvised dwellings	4	0	3	9
Occupied Private Dwellings (Households)	186	185	141	174
No Motor Vehicle	12	12	8	10
Caravan, cabin, houseboat or improvised dwell	5	0	3	0
Rented via State or Housing Authority	0	0	0	4
Rented via Housing Co-Op or Community Church Group	0	4	0	3
Unoccupied Private Dwellings	30	40	27	22
Average persons per occupied dwelling	1.8	2.2	2.1	2
Average vehicles per occupied dwelling	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8

SPECIFIC RISK AREAS - FLOOD

Richmond River Basin

2.2 KYOGLE SECTOR

2.2.1 Community Overview

- a. The Kyogle Sector is located within the Richmond River Basin, bordering Queensland to the north, Tweed Shire and Lismore City to the east and the Richmond Valley and Clarence Valley to the south.
- b. The main population centre of Kyogle has a population of 2804 people living in 1147 dwellings. It has an Indigenous population of 5.6% (2).

2.2.2 Characteristics of flooding

a. In Kyogle, flooding is usually of a short duration and principally originating from Richmond River floodwater. This causes Fawcett's Creek to back up and then flood the low-lying areas of the town. The Richmond and Fawcett's Creek can peak almost simultaneously however. This occurred in 1954 and resulted in high flood discharges from both sources (1).

2.2.3 Flood Behaviour

- a. "The Flats", which is bound to the north by Fawcetts Creek and to the west by the Richmond River, is now provided with increased flood immunity up to the 10% AEP event following the construction of the Kyogle Levee.
- b. During flood events larger than the 10% AEP event (when levee overtopping is predicted to occur) the levee structure will increase flood warning and evacuation time for "the Flats" by 2 to 4 hours to 10 to 12 hours depending on the magnitude of the event. Additionally, flood flows passing through "the Flats" during moderate sized flood events will be significantly reduced.
- c. The additional Fawcetts Creek flood breakout provides an outlet for floodwaters from Fawcetts Creek into the Richmond River. It also reduces flood levels in Fawcetts Creek. In combination with the partial ring levee the additional Fawcetts Creek flood breakout successfully offsets the possible increase in flood levels to residents upstream of the proposed partial ring levee of "the Flats" (4).

2.2.4 Classification of Floodplain

a. The Kyogle Sector can be further broken into down into subsector for floodplain classification, these classifications are as follows:

Polygon ID	Polygon Name	Flood Emergency Response Classification of Community	Population Estimate	Dwelling Estimate	Vehicle Estimate
18	Low Lying Kyogle	Low Flood Island	11	5	9
19	The Flats	Low Flood Island	218	94	169
59076	Kyogle West	Rising Road Access	604	280	504
59077	Kyogle East	Indirectly Affected Area	2151	1039	1870
59078	Kyogle North	Low Flood Island	99	53	95
59079	Kyogle South	Low Flood Island	23	10	18
59080 Golf Course Estate Ov		Overland Escape Route	11	5	9
59081	Wiangaree Central	Low Flood Island	100	47	85
59082	Wiangaree East	Indirectly Affected Area	21	9	16
59083	Doubtful Creek	Indirectly Affected Area	11	5	9
59084	Fawcetts Plain Road	Low Flood Island	22	10	18
59085	Summerland Way	Low Flood Island	92	46	83
59086	Wiangaree West	Low Flood Island	12	7	12
59087	Kyogle Rural	Indirectly Affected Area	62	28	50
59088	Cedar Point and Rural	Low Flood Island	81	34	61
59089	Ettrick Rural	Low Flood Island	88	39	70
59090	The Risk Public School	Low Flood Island	4	2	4
59091	Rukenvale Public School	Low Flood Island	4	2	4
59092	Old Grevillia	Low Flood Island	4	2	4

b. Eastern Kyogle is a High Flood Island along Summerland Way between Geneva Street and Andrew Street.

2.2.5 Inundation

- a. Kyogle utilises both the Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002) and Wiangaree Gauge (203005-558001), the latter provides flood warning time for Kyogle of 6-8 hours (16). The Wiangaree Flood Intelligence card should be utilised with the Kyogle Flood Intelligence card (19).
- b. Historically, various areas of Kyogle have experienced high flood risk during small to moderate sized flood events.
- c. Wiangaree Gauge (203005 558001)
- d. **Minor Floods** (11m)
- e. At 12.25m on the Wiangaree Gauge (203005-558001), this usually results in a river height of 15.5m -15.8m on the Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002) approximately 6-8 hours later. This is the height at which the river breaks across "The Flats" at Kyogle and cuts off evacuation routes into the main part of Kyogle (14).
- f. Moderate Floods (15.5m)
- g. Summerland Way is cut at 15.5m (19)
- h. Kyogle Gauge (203900 558002)
- i. Minor Floods (12m)
- j. At between 13m 13.5m Summerland Way is cut by flood water at the intersection of Murwillumbah Road and the evacuation route for Kyogle Caravan Park is lost.

k. At 14m the Kyogle Caravan Park experience over ground flooding and Murwillumbah Road is cut at the Fawcetts Plain turnoff.

I. Moderate Floods (14.4m)

- m. At 14.5m Summerland Way is cut at the railway viaduct north of Fawcetts Creek Bridge.
- n. In historic floods at 15.5m "The Flats" have become affected (17).

o. Major Floods (16m)

- p. At approximately 17.5m, when the levee begins to overtop, "The Flats" starts to become affected.
- q. Following the construction of the Kyogle Levee and additional Fawcetts Creek flood breakout, the number of properties inundated has been significantly reduced in a 10% AEP event and somewhat reduced in a 5% AEP event. There is, however, little change in the number of properties inundated from the 2% AEP event (16).
- r. In other parts of Kyogle, properties are also inundated during small to moderate sized events, incurring significant flood damages. Fortunately, these properties have access to high, flood free ground which reduces the flood risk to the residents of these properties (4).

Table 5: Estimated number of properties inundated above floor level in Kyogle (4)

• These numbers are based on post-levee projections from the 2009 Kyogle Flood Risk Management Plan (4).

Design Event	No. Properties with Over floor Flooding
50% AEP	0
20% AEP	0
10% AEP	12
5% AEP	54
2% AEP	91
1% AEP	98
0.2% AEP	110
PMF	146

2.2.6 Isolation

- a. Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002)
- b. Minor Floods (12m)
- c. At 2m -5m some rural properties become isolated.
- d. At 14m rural residents to the north and east of Kyogle are isolated (14).
- e. Moderate Floods (14.4m)

- f. At 14.7m residents of the Golf Course Estate are isolated (14).
- g. During a 5% AEP flood, properties along Summerland Way between Geneva Street and Andrew Street will become isolated.
- h. Properties along Kyogle Road between Geneva Street and Kindergarten Lane will also become isolated during a 5% AEP event (18).

2.2.7 Flood Mitigation Systems

 Table 6:
 Levees in Kyogle Sector; summary of information (19)

Kyogle Levee	
Location	The Kyogle Levee starts to the north-west of McDougal St running north of McDougall St before running partially along Anzac Drive
Type of Levee (ring etc.)	Partial ring levee
Owner	Kyogle Council
Design Height and freeboard	Levee design height is 57.75m AHD which equates to 17.53m on the Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002) on the Richmond River
Overtopping Height	57.75m AHD which equates to 17.53m on the Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002)
No. of properties protected	60 properties are protected by the levee
Known low points	The approximately 50m section opposite the natural lagoon in Anzac Park on the southern bank of Fawcetts Creek is 50mm lower than the main body of the levee bank to allow for initial overtopping through the lateral lagoon. There is a section of bank excavated to the west of the levee between Fawcetts Creek and the Richmond River that allows for flood waters to be diverted from Fawcetts Creek to the Richmond River. The base of the channel is at 52.5m AHD and the channel is approximately 30m wide and 5m deep
Location and sequence of inundation	Inundation is from downstream in-fill flood waters rising from the southern end of the watershed downstream of the natural lagoon in Anzac Park. Levee is designed to provide full downstream flooding against levee face prior to overtopping. Refer "Post-levee" inundation mapping in Floodplain Risk Management Plan
Consequences of levee overtopping or failure	Levee is designed to provide full downstream flooding against levee face prior to overtopping to avoid failure of levee due to excess scouring following overtopping. Main consequence of overtopping is increased flow velocities downstream of levee. Refer "Post-levee" inundation mapping in Floodplain Risk Management Plan
Deficiencies	No deficiencies are known

2.2.8 Dams

- a. Toonumbar Dam is located on Iron Pot Creek, 20km west of Kyogle, in the Richmond River Basin. Its downstream communities are Ettrick, Doubtful Creek, Dobies Bight, Casino and Ghinni Ghi. Key consequences of a dambreak are increased levels in Iron Pot Creek and Richmond River (8).
- b. See Section 1.3

2.2.9 At Risk Facilities

a. The facilities that are at risk of flooding and/or isolation within the Kyogle LGA including schools, childcare centres, hospitals, aged and infirm, infrastructure and caravan parks are shown in Annex 2.

2.2.10 Other Considerations

- a. Kyogle holds an annual one-day Pumpkin and Watermelon festival in January.
- b. The Kyogle Show is held for two days in October.
- c. These events need to be taken into account in relation to possible Flood Outlook Scenarios issued by the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM).

Clarence River Basin

2.3 BONALBO SECTOR

2.3.1 Community Overview

- a. The Bonalbo Sector is located within the Clarence River Basin, to the west of Kyogle Sector and southeast of the Urbenville Sector. Larger villages within the sector include Bonalbo and Tabulam, as well as numerous smaller settlements.
- b. The village of Bonalbo has a population of 338 people living in 186 dwellings, and an indigenous population of 10.9% (2).
- c. The village of Tabulam has a population of 508 people living in 186 dwellings, and an indigenous population of 28.7% (2).

2.3.2 Characteristics of Flooding

Bonalbo

- a. Bonalbo is subject to two forms of flooding, riverine flooding from Peacock Creek as well as overland flows from the smaller catchments which drain though the town.
- b. At the southern end of the town flooding is dominated by riverine flooding from Peacock Creek. Peacock Creek is a winding creek system with approximately 121 km² catchment size as it passes Bonalbo. In some areas, there is only a small distance between the creek and surrounding properties of less than 100 m. In high flow events it is prone to exceeding its channel capacity into the surrounding floodplain.
- c. Overland flows drain from the urban catchment through the existing stormwater network and discharges into two natural detention basins on the downstream side of the village.
- d. The local catchment for Bonalbo is quite small in comparison to the catchment of Peacock Creek; approximately 5 km². Catchments are characterised by steep upper slopes with the town located on the flatter areas. The town is located at the bottom of these catchments and receives flows from these ranges. The town itself has two major channels running through it, Capeen Street drain and one parallel to Bonalbo Street from the hospital catchment. Both channels hydraulic capacity can be exceeded in large storm events cutting road access in the town.
- e. A levee, which is located parallel to Oak Street, directs flows from the catchment to the northwest into the Capeen Street Drain. Runoff from the catchments to the north flows down the hills and can build up behind Woodenbong Road. Even in more frequent events such as the 20% AEP, floodwaters have the potential to cross Woodenbong Road and flow across properties along Lunar Lane. The rest of the

flows from these catchments continues along Woodenbong Road to the channel that runs parallel to Bonalbo Street.

- f. Flows and ponding of water near to the Bowling Club and sporting fields along Tooloom Street affects properties at the south-eastern end of the town. In the more frequent events this area is subject to inundation from the local catchments north of Woodenbong Road as flows move southwest towards a tributary to Peacock Creek. In the 1% AEP event and greater, flows from Peacock Creek spill into the floodplain and flow through this area exacerbating flooding further.
- g. In larger flooding events such as the 1% AEP and onwards the flooding from the Creek is dominant on the southeastern edges of the town. When the creek spills out into the floodplain it inundates areas of the town along Woodenbong Road and Peacock Street. The remainder of the town is typically affected by shallow overland flows. However, localised areas of high hazard floodways can develop near to the two town channels and where the channels are exceeded and also where road cross drainage is exceeded. This can cause streets to become unsafe for people and vehicles (5).

Tabulam

- The main source of flooding in Tabulam is Riverine flooding from the Clarence River. The Clarence River has a catchment area upstream of the village of 4,550km², while the Timbarra River, a major tributary which joins the Clarence River 2km downstream of Tabulam (catchment area upstream of the junction of 2,000km²), may contribute with backwater flooding from its own catchment. The Tabulam Rivulet (catchment area 315km²) located immediately north of the village may also contribute to flooding.
- b. Tabulam may also be affected by localised flooding caused by heavy rainfall in the village (13).

Mallanganee

a. Mallanganee is subject to flooding from the Little Creek catchment upstream as well influence from the breakout flows from the larger southern flow path (7).

2.3.3 Flood Behaviour

Bonalbo

a. Bonalbo is subjected to flooding from both local overland flows and riverine flooding from Peacock Creek. For events up to an including 5% AEP Peacock Creek flows typically stay within the Creek. For these events, flooding in the town is dominated by local overland flows from the local catchments and the Capeen Street and hospital and dam catchment drains being exceeded.

- b. At the southern end of the town local catchments from north on Bonalbo Road pass over the road and through the open area and properties at the lower end of Sandilands Street and adjacent streets. Flows follow a route which is a natural flood runner of the creek in larger magnitude events.
- In the town the critical duration storm is relatively short; typically one hour.
 However, in the more frequent events the Bowling Club and sports field areas area affected by longer duration events as flatter areas act as flood storage.
- d. For riverine flooding the critical duration storm is longer given the larger catchment areas. In larger events such as the 1% AEP and greater, Peacock Creek spills into the floodplain downstream of the Woodenbong Bridge at the Bowling Club and Tourist Park and Camping ground following the natural flood runner and becomes the dominant source of flooding at the south-eastern end of the town.
- e. In the 20% AEP event flows from Peacock Creek typically remain in channel and the majority of flooding within the Bonalbo township is from the overland flows coming from the town catchment. Depths are typically shallow and less than 300 mm however some localised areas of high hazard and floodways can occur in particular on Koreelah Street between Sandilands and Capeen Streets.
- f. Some flooding occurs from near the Bonalbo Bowling Club and sports field from local catchments and the small catchments north of Woodenbong Road. Flows move towards the drain near Tooloom Streets and towards the tributary to Peacock Creek at the south of the town.
- g. Flooding behaviour in the 5% AEP event is similar to the 20% AEP event. The creek exceeds its main channel but does not extend significantly into the floodplain. The town flooding is dominated by the local catchment flooding.
- h. In the 1% AEP event flows from Peacock Creek spill into the floodplain and contributes to flooding within the town. Areas east of Peacock Street and south of Woodenbong Road are dictated by overbank flooding of Peacock Creek. Flows move through the flood runner from the Bowling Club area forming a floodway towards the tributary and back to the creek at downstream of the town.
- i. In the town area affected by overland flood depths are typically less than 0.5m, with the exception of localised areas where flooding from the drainage or exceedance of cross drainage structures occurs. With the exception for these areas flood hazard is typically H1 and H2.
- j. In the 0.2% AEP event the flood behaviour is similar to the 1% AEP event in terms of areas affected by Creek and overland flow flooding. Flood depths are increased, in particular at the south-eastern portion of the town where the creek flows have the greater influence on the flood levels.

k. In the PMF event the Peacock Creek flooding is the main driver for peak flood levels up to Dyraaba street. Floodwaters from Peacock Creek extent slightly north of Woodenbong Road, and south of Sandilands Street and east of Dyraaba Street and east of Peacock Street. Depths become significant in this area and are in excess of 1m up to more than 5 m south of the town. High velocity and high hazard flows affect most of study area (5).

Tabulam

- a. In the 20% AEP event (122.57mAHD at the Tabulam Gauge), flows break out from the river into minor flow paths at and north of Court Street which then flow south and south-east.
- Parts of the village are impacted by low to moderately high hazard flooding (H3- H4 classification, meaning unsafe for most up to all people and vehicles) up to and including the 5% AEP event (126.06mAHD at the Tabulam Gauge).
- c. In the 2% AEP event (128.62mAHD at the Tabulam Gauge), flooding occurs both north and south of the Bruxner Highway, creating a High Flood Island in the village.
 Flood hazard varies from H2-H5 throughout, with the highest hazard (H5, or unsafe for all people and vehicles, with buildings requiring special engineering design and construction) experienced at the highway to the west of the Clarence River.
- In the 1% AEP event (129.29mAHD at the Tabulam Gauge), flooding is extensive through the village. A high flood island remains in the village in the 1% AEP event.
 The Bruxner Highway is cut off between Clarence Street and Lawrence Street.
- e. The village is fully inundated from the 0.5% AEP design flood event (130.87mAHD at the Tabulam Gauge), and in the design extreme flood event, flood depths in the village range from 8-15m. It should be noted this modelled event is dominated by Clarence River flooding (16).

Predicted Flood Frequency	Tabulam Gauge Height
	(m AHD)
20% AEP	122.57
10% AEP	124.21
5% AEP	126.06
2% AEP	128.62
1% AEP	129.29
0.5% AEP	130.87
0.2% AEP	132.75
Extreme	138.99

Table 7:	Elood Design Heights for the	- Tahulam Causa	(204002 552000) (16)
Table 7:	Flood Design Heights for the	e Tabulam Gauge	(204002-557000) (TP)

Design Event	Maximum rate of rise (m/hr)	Rate of rise from start of flood to peak (m/hr)
20% AEP	1.3	0.1
10% AEP	1.9	0.3
5% AEP	1.5	0.2
2% AEP	1.6	0.2
1% AEP	2.8	0.9
0.5% AEP	3.3	0.9
0.2% AEP	3.7	1.0
Extreme Flood Clarence River	3.9	1.1
Extreme Flood Tabulam Rivulet	2.8	1.0

Table 8: Modelled Flood level rates of rise for Design Events in Tabulam (16)

2.3.4 Classification of Floodplain

a. The Bonalbo Sector can be further broken into down into subsector for floodplain classification, these classifications are as follows:

Polygon ID	Polygon Name	Flood Emergency Response Classification of Community	Population Estimate	Dwelling Estimate	Vehicle Estimate
59065	Mallanganee south	High Flood Island	2	1	2
59066	Mallanganee A	Low Flood Island	7	4	7
59067	Tabulam Centre	High Flood Island	23	12	22
59068	Tabulam North	Low Flood Island	25	13	23
59069	Tabulam South	Low Flood Island	74	39	70
59070	Bonalbo A	Low Flood Island	32	20	36
59071	Bonablo B	Rising Road Access	235	151	272
59072	Bonalbo C	Overland Escape Route	31	22	40
59073	Bonalbo D	Indirectly Affected Area	31	20	36
59074	Bonlbo E	High Trapped Perimeter	N/A	N/A	N/A
59075	Bonalbo G	Overland Escape Route	2	1	2
59262	Mallanganee North	Rising Road Access	85	49	88
59263	Bonalbo F	High Trapped Perimeter	2	1	2
59093	Old Bonalbo	Low Flood Island	78	55	99

Bonalbo

a. Within Low Flood Island and Rising Road Access areas, the first areas to be cut-off are the properties south of Peacock Street when Peacock Creek breaks it banks and goes across the flood runner. These areas would be Peacock Street when Peacock Creek breaks it banks and goes across the flood runner. These areas would be priority for evacuation. For areas subject to overland flows, the short duration of the critical storms mean that flooding is flash flooding type, and the areas can be cut suddenly. For minor local storms most properties of those towards the south of Bonalbo town) would remain safe within their homes (5).

Tabulam

a. Tabulam is classified as a High Flood Island up until the 1% AEP event, after which the town becomes completely inundated (13).

2.3.5 Inundation

Bonalbo

- Bonalbo does not have a BOM forecast gauge. Currently, the only available gauges within the catchment of Bonalbo are the daily rainfall gauge within town and the water level gauge on Peacock Creek (204043 – 557004), which has been acknowledged by WaterNSW as inaccurate.
- b. Overland flooding is predicted by forecasting and measuring the amount of rainfall falling within the town typically through BOM rainfall radar.
- c. Riverine flooding can be measured predicted by the upstream water level gauge on Peacock Creek. However, this gauge has a low level of accuracy for larger flood events, with the highest level on the current rating curve being 1.3m above the datum.
- d. The gauge is 7km upstream of Bonalbo, providing up to 1-2 hours warning time, if the peak and size of the flow can be accurately measured.
- e. Within Bonalbo, properties can begin to become inundated from the 20% AEP event.
- f. In the 5% properties along Woodenbong Road down to the southeastern end of Sandilands Street start to become inundated (12).

Design Event	No. Properties with Over floor Flooding	No. Properties with Over- ground Flooding
20% AEP	13	80
5% AEP	23	99
1% AEP	34	113
0.2% AEP	42	125
PMF	101	148

Table 9: Estimated number of properties inundated above floor level and over ground in
Bonalbo (12)

Tabulam

- a. Tabulam does not have a BOM forecast gauge, however the Tabulam Gauge (204002–557000) can provide an indication of inundation.
- Existing dwellings in the village are not impacted in the 20% AEP flood. Overall, fringe flooding begins to encroach on some dwellings in the 10% and 5% AEP flood events but there is generally no over floor flooding.

- c. In the 5% AEP event there is one property on Harry Mundine Place with over floor flooding over 0.8m deep.
- d. Flooding of the village occurs both north and south of the Bruxner Highway in the 2% AEP event, creating a high flood island in the village. More than half of the buildings are inundated. The highway is inundated between Clarence Street and Lawrence Street but remains passable for larger vehicles (depths up to 0.4m).
- e. Tabulam Rivulet bridge, with deck level of 127.6m AHD, is above the 5% AEP event and submerged to depths of 1.3m in the 2% AEP event.
- f. The new bridge deck is not overtopped in the 2% AEP event.
- g. In the 1% AEP event, flooding is extensive through the village, with many properties affected by flooding of 1 3m deep above ground, and a number of properties in the south of the village with 3 5m deep flooding above ground. A high flood island remains in the village in the 1% AEP event. The highway is cut off between Clarence Street and Lawrence Street to depths of 1.7m. The new bridge deck is partly submerged to 0.3m depth, on its western side.
- In the 0.5% AEP event the entire village is fully inundated with property flooding of 0.5m on the low flood island (i.e. a high point in the landscape which is a dry island at early stages of the flood but which then becomes submerged) up to 6.7m on low properties adjoining the floodway. There are several dwellings above the 0.5% AEP flood to the east of Lawrence Street. The new bridge deck is submerged to depths of 0.7 2m.

Mallanganee

- a. During the 10% AEP event, properties north of Sandilands Street are generally unaffected excepting one property between Culverts 21 and 22.
- b. However, properties on the eastern side of Pine Street are affected by local flooding during the 10% AEP event (7).

2.3.6 Isolation

Bonalbo

a. Bonalbo township becomes frequently isolated from the wider community. During events in the last 15 years including 2010 and 2011, roads such as the Clarence Way between Urbenville and Bonalbo were cut by floodwaters while much of the town remained unaffected by direct flooding (5).

Tabulam

a. During significant flood events, such as the 2011 event, Tabulam can become isolated for a short period of time (13).

2.3.7 Flood Mitigation Systems

Bonalbo Levee	
Location	Parallel to Oak Street on the western side between Capeen Street and Sandilands Street
Type of Levee (ring etc)	Diversion drain
Owner	Kyogle Council
Design Height and freeboard	Approximately 600mm high diversion mound
Overtopping Height	Not known
No. of properties protected	6 properties
Known low points	
Location and sequence of inundation	Not known
Consequences of levee overtopping or failure	Overland flow through properties between Capeen Street and Sandilands Street
Deficiencies	No formal design basis for the construction, initially constructed ad hoc to address frequent overland flows causing nuisance

Table 10: Levees in Bonalbo, summary of information (19)

2.3.8 Dams

- a. The Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam is located upstream of the town and used for water supply. The dam comprises an earth embankment and piped outlet spillway and bywash overflow channel. Water is pumped to the dam from an intake well from Peacock Creek and a groundwater bore adjacent to the creek.
- b. The 2004 Bonalbo Dam Dambreak Study found that the dambreak wave travel time to the populated area is in the order of five minutes which gives no time for warning and evacuation. The 2005 Bonalbo Dambreak Study Addendum re-assessed the consequence categories for the various dambreak cases. The dam failure consequence was defined as "High C" for both Sunny Day Dambreak Consequence Category (SDCC) and Incremental Flood Consequence Category (IFCC). The Addendum report suggests 46 properties downstream of the dam would be affected in the PMF event with a Population at Risk (PAR) of 124, increasing to 51 properties in a dam failure scenario with a PAR of 138 (5).

2.3.9 At Risk Facilities

a. The facilities that are at risk of flooding and/or isolation within Kyogle LGA including schools, childcare centres, hospitals, aged and infirm, infrastructure and caravan parks are shown in Annex 2.

2.3.10 Other Considerations

a. No other considerations have been identified.

2.4 URBENVILLE SECTOR

Clarence River Basin

2.4.1 Community Overview

- a. Whilst Urbenville is situated within the Tenterfield Shire Council LGA, local agreements have been agreed to for the SES Urbenville Unit (Richmond Tweed Command) to manage flood operations in Urbenville and Woodenbong and their vicinities (3).
- b. Urbenville has a population of 331 people living 141 dwellings and an indigenous population of 14.5%.
- c. Woodenbong has a population of 390 people living in 174 dwellings and an indigenous population of 5.6% (2).

2.4.2 Characteristics of Flooding

- a. Woodenbong and Urbenville are subject to two types of flooding; overland flows from local catchments and riverine flooding from Tooloom Creek and its tributaries.
- b. At Urbenville, flooding is dominated by Tooloom Creek especially in the larger events. There is overland flow flooding throughout the town in smaller events and in the northeast of the town in larger events between Beaury Street and Stephen Street. The catchment of Tooloom Creek upstream of Urbenville is 170.9 km², the local catchment of Urbenville is 2.6 km², and the catchment of Boomi Creek which intersects with Tooloom Creek downstream of the Urbenville is 114.8 km².
- c. At Woodenbong, flooding is affected by local overland flows due to the terrain and Woodenbong sitting on a high point in comparison to Tooloom Creek. Overland flows join Black Gully which overtops Roseberry Street and affects properties to the south in severe events. This tributary then drains into Tooloom Creek. The local catchment of Woodenbong is 8.4 km² and the catchment area of Tooloom Creek upstream of Woodenbong is 112 km².
- d. The Tooloom Creek and Boomi Creek valleys that connect Urbenville and Woodenbong are subject to flooding causing inundation of the roads and isolating the community. Flooding also can occur in the towns from the local creeks and overland flows (6).

2.4.3 Flood Behaviour

Urbenville

a. At Urbenville, flooding from Tooloom Creek is the dominant source of flooding. This is due to the winding nature of the creek slowing down the conveyance of floodwaters within the natural creek bed. The intersection of the Boomi and

Tooloom Creek occurs just downstream from Urbenville which also contributes to the higher creek levels.

- b. During the 20% AEP event, floodwaters largely remain within Tooloom Creek, although there are breakout flows downstream of Clarence Way Road bridge into the open areas behind Tooloom Street. Depths are between 200 to 300 mm and inundate some lots south of Tooloom Street. Floodwaters also overtop Clarence Way near to the showground with depths of 200 mm over the road. There is no culvert crossing at this location, although drainage channels are evident either side of the road. The flooding that occurs in the town is dominated by flow from the local catchments. The majority of flooding occurs in the natural flow path as water travels from the hill slopes west of the town. Minor flow paths form between the Welch and Urben Street as overland flows downhill. When the overland flows join the Tooloom Creek they overtop Tooloom Street with depths up to 400 mm. Flood levels here are dominated by flows from Tooloom Creek.
- c. During the 5% AEP event, floodwaters have broken out of the Tooloom Creek, with up to 1m depths on the floodplain south of Tooloom Street. There are flood water depths of up to 600 mm on the lots on the south side of Tooloom Street. Clarence Way road is overtopped with depths of 400 mm on the road. Tooloom Street is overtopped from tailwaters of Tooloom Creek with depths of 1m over the road. The flooding in the town is caused from flows in local catchments with floodwaters travelling downhill between Welch and Urben Street.
- d. During the 1% AEP event, depths of up to 1.6m are predicted to occur on lots on Tooloom Street. Floodwaters from Tooloom Creek cross Tooloom Street to properties on the north side of the street. There are predicted depths of up to 0.8m on Clarence Way and backwaters from the creek cause depths of 2.6m on Tooloom Street near the Old Saw Mill, the flooding from Tooloom Creek reaches the south end of Boomi Street. The flooding within the town is from overland flows besides the floodwaters south of Boomi Street.
- e. During the 0.2% AEP event the flood behaviour is similar to the 1% AEP event in terms of areas affected by creek and overland flow flooding asides from the creek floodwaters have crept further into the town crossing further over Tooloom Street and approaching Stephen Street.
- f. During the PMF event all the floodwaters are predominantly from Tooloom Creek.
 Depths become very significant and reach up to 9 m on Tooloom Street. High hazard affects most of the study area (6).

Woodenbong

a. At Woodenbong floodwaters from Tooloom Creek are predicted to exceed capacity of the creek channel in the 20% AEP or more frequent events. These inundate the floodplain which includes the sporting fields and showground. Floodwaters from the creek do not encroach into the town until the PMF where it affects the northern most lots of Roseberry Lane.

- b. Local catchment flows at Woodenbong affect properties along Richmond Street as flows from the township and the natural channel in this area encroach into backyards of properties in as frequent as the 20% AEP event. Mount Lindsay Road also becomes inundated to the east of Richmond Street intersection. Within the town there is minimal flooding within properties as local flows are typically contained within the drainage channels alongside the roads.
- c. During the 5% AEP event the flooding is very similar except the flood extents caused by the creek backwaters have expanded. At Richmond Street floodwater from the local catchments travel in the natural channel behind Richmond Street and overtop the levee.
- d. The 1% AEP event is very similar to the 5% AEP event, with greater flood depths on the showground, playing fields and Lindsay Creek Road from Tooloom Creek backwaters.
- e. The 0.2% AEP event is very similar to the 1% AEP event. Additionally, the industrial sheds along Roseburry Road are inundated from these floodwaters. Here town still remains predominantly flood free with minor flow paths alongside the roads. The majority of flows from the external catchment travel through the flowpath behind Richmond Street and overtopping the levee into the properties, all properties north of Dalmorton Street are inundated in this event with depths up to 1.0 m. Across the Tooloom and Boomi Creeks between the two towns in the 0.2% AEP event the connecting roads between towns are inundated in multiple areas.
- f. In the PMF event at Woodenbong there are greater flood depths on the showground, playing fields and Lindsay Creek Road from Tooloom Creek backwaters. Properties up to Roseberry Lane are inundated by floodwaters. The town still remains predominantly flood free with flow paths alongside the roads and crossing a small amount of properties. The majority of properties behind Richmond Street are now inundated from floodwater in the channel behind the properties (6).

Tooloom and Boomi Creeks

- a. Throughout the Tooloom Creek catchment, the Tooloom Creek expands into the floodplain in the 20% AEP or more frequent event. There are a number of areas where Clarence Way is overtopped in particular near to Muli Muli.
- Boomi Creek runs alongside Boomi Creek Road until it joins Tooloom Creek downstream of Urbenville. In events more frequent than the 20% AEP event, floodwaters spread out of creek channel and into the floodplain. Boomi Creek overtops Boomi Creek Road where the road is in a close vicinity to the creek and

where Boomi Creek Road crosses the creek. Local tributaries also overtop the road however, these depths typically are less significant than the creek flooding.

- c. In the 5% AEP for the Tooloom Creek catchment between the towns, the creek remains mainly within its channel with minor locations of breakout flows such as at Woodenbong. There is a small number of locations where the road is are flooded with the major flooding of the roadway occurring near Muli Muli. The town of Muli Muli is above the creek flood level in this flood event. The road is not passable with the path to the north and south with a hazard rating of unsafe for vehicles.
- d. In the 1% AEP event between the two towns the connecting roads are inundated at multiple locations near Muli Muli and Urbenville. Further inundation occurs from mainstream flooding of the creeks and connecting tributaries flooding the roads (6).

Muli Muli

a. Muli Muli is located near to Tooloom Creek on an area of high ground. The town is not affected from flood waters in the 0.5% AEP event but in events greater than this up to the PMF event, Muli Muli Crescent, the street closest to Tooloom Creek, is inundated. Clarence Way to the north and the south is predicted to be flooded events more frequent than the 20% AEP flood event. This road is the only road access way to Muli Muli (6).

2.4.4 Classification of Floodplain

a. The Urbenville Sector can be further broken into down into subsector for floodplain classification, these classifications are as follows:

Polygon ID	Polygon Name	Flood Emergency Response Classification of Community	Population Estimate	Dwelling Estimate	Vehicle Estimate
59094	Urbanville A	Rising Road Access	114	63	113
59691	Urbanville B	Low Flood Island	0	0	0
59095	Urbanville D	High Trapped Perimeter	4	2	3.6
59096	Urbanville C	High Trapped Perimeter	77	43	77
59097	Woodenbong A	High Trapped Perimeter	6	3	5
59098	Woodenbong B	Low Flood Island	81	47	85
59099	Woodenbong C	Indirectly Affected Area	254	138	248
59100	Muli Muli Crescent	Low Flood Island	19	6	11
59101	Muli Muli Hillside	High Trapped Perimeter	25	8	14

Urbenville

a. The Old Saw Mill on Tooloom Road is classified as Area with Overland Escape Route, the roads are cut off from the local catchment overland paths. This area is within the PMF extent and could be subject to inundation. There are overland escape routes via foot, however this would be to no habitable areas to evacuate to only the surrounding bushland which is classified as High Trapped Area.

Woodenbong

- a. At Woodenbong, the majority of the town is classed as Indirectly Affected. There is an escape route from the town through Boomi Creek Road and Old Bruxner Creek Road. This is an unsealed road, which may not be passable to all vehicles in an extreme weather event. This road joins Mount Lindesay Road further east of the town outside of the flooding from Tooloom Creek.
- b. Areas within the flood extent are classed as Rising Road Access as they have road access to move to higher ground before being inundated.

Tooloom and Boomi Creek

- a. Throughout the Tooloom Creek catchment areas in the floodplain are typically considered as High Trapped Perimeter Areas. Areas outside of the flood extents could be cut from vehicular or overland on foot access to areas of safety.
- Areas within the PMF flood extent are classified as Areas with Overland Escape Routes, these areas are able to leave before being flooded, however can only travel to the High Trapped Perimeter Areas.

Muli Muli

- a. Muli Muli is a High Trapped Perimeter area due to inundation of the Clarence Way to the north and south in the 20% AEP event.
- b. The town itself is not flooded until events larger than the 0.05% AEP event however has no means of evacuation or self-resupply (6).

2.4.5 Inundation

Urbenville

- a. Urbenville does not have a BOM forecast gauge. There is however a BOM rainfall gauge (57020).
- b. Comparison of flood model results and anecdotal flooding evidence from community at Urbenville indicates that the following areas can become inundated.
- c. Over ground flooding at 6 Urben Street with depths of 150mm.
- Water over road at Toolom Road at the Old Saw Mill with varying depths from 300mm to 1.5m.
- e. Water over road on Clarence Way bridge heading to Bonalbo, with depths of up to 400mm (6).

Woodenbong

a. Woodenbong does not have a BOM forecast gauge.

- b. Comparison of flood model results and anecdotal flooding evidence from community at Woodenbong indicates that the following areas can become inundated.
- c. Over ground flooding at 31 Richmond Street with varying depths of 400mm to 500mm.
- d. Knee deep slow flowing water at Woodenbong Caravan Park with depths between 300mm and 600mm.
- e. Over ground flooding at Recreation Road with depths of up to 1.2m inundating lower paddocks.
- f. Over ground flooding at 29 Richmond Street affecting properties with depths of up to 500mm.
- g. Overground flooding at 25 and 27 Richmond Street with depths of up to 200mm.
- h. Over road flooding at Black Gully Culvert on Lindsay Creek Road with depths over road between 1m and 1.7m (6).

2.4.6 Isolation

- a. In Urbenville, up to 129 properties to the west of Urben Street and north of Beaury Street can become isolated. This area is above the PMF extent of the creek but has no route for evacuation.
- b. In Woodenbong up to 184 properties are indirectly affected but is not expected to become isolated (6).

2.4.7 Flood Mitigation Systems

Table 11: Levees in Woodenbong summary of information (19)

Woodenbong Levee	
Location	Bonalbo Lane between Dalmorton Street and Unumgar Street
Type of Levee (ring etc)	Diversion drain
Owner	Kyogle Council
Design Height and freeboard	Approximately 600mm high diversion mound with 2.5m wide crest
Overtopping Height	Not known
No. of properties protected	6 properties
Known low points	The drainage channel under Unumgar Street near the intersection with Richmond Street
Location and sequence of inundation	Not known

Consequences of levee overtopping or failure	Overland flow through properties on Richmond Street and Bonalbo Lane
Deficiencies	No formal design basis for the construction, initially constructed ad hoc to address frequent overland flows causing nuisance

2.4.8 Dams

a. Two prescribed dams in Queensland, Maroon Dam (Gauge ID 40677) and Moogerah (Gauge ID 40135), located north and north-west of Woodenbong have been identified (6). No dam failure consequences for Woodenbong have been identified (10) (11).

2.4.9 At Risk Facilities

a. The facilities that are at risk of flooding and/or isolation within Kyogle LGA including schools, childcare centres, hospitals, aged and infirm, infrastructure and caravan parks are shown in Annex 2.

2.4.10 Other Considerations

- a. Urbenville hosts an annual one-day camp draft event in May.
- b. Woodenbong host the Woodenbong Show annually in September.
- c. These events need to be taken into account in relation to possible Flood Outlook Scenarios issued by BOM.

ROAD CLOSURES AND ISOLATED COMMUNITIES

2.5 ROAD CLOSURES

a. Table 12 lists roads liable to flooding in Kyogle LGA.

Table 12: Roads liable to flooding in Kyogle LGA.

Road Kyogle Sector	Closure location	Consequence of closure	Alternate Route	Indicative gauge height or design event
Summerland Way	Intersection of Kyogle Road	Evacuation route for Kyogle Caravan Park is lost and evacuation must be completed before flood expected to reach or exceed 14.5m	Nil	13m -13.5m Kyogle Gauge (203900- 558002)
Kyogle Road	At the Fawcett's Plain turnoff	Rural residents to north and north east of Kyogle isolated	Nill	14m on Kyogle Gauge (203900- 558002)
Summerland Way	Northern end of the town - at the Railway viaduct	Kyogle Caravan Park isolated and/or inundated.	Nil	14.5m Kyogle Gauge (203900- 558002)
Summerland Way	Reynold's Bridge about 9km south of Kyogle	Access to Casino cut	Nill	Gauge height not known
Bonalbo and Tabulam Sector				
Koreelah St	Between Sandilands and Capeen St	Can be a high hazard floodway. May cut off access from southern portion of town to main access roads.	Alternate route may be possible via Peacock St towards Woodenbong Rd	Approx. 20% AEP event
Farm Road	Near Golf Course	Loss of single road access in and out of Bonalbo for Lower Peacock area.	Nil	Has occurred in previous events as frequent as 50%AEP
Woodenbong Road	Intersection of Woodenbong Road and Cope Street intersection	May disrupt main access route in and out of Bonalbo.	Local roads may provide alternate route to flood free parts of Woodenbong Rd, however may	Shallow inundation (<0.2m) from a 20% AEP. Would be cut

			also be subject to inundation in a PMF.	off in a PMF at 173.24mAHD.
Woodenbong Road	Hospital Road intersection	May disrupt main access route in and out of Bonalbo. May cut off access route to Bonalbo Multi-Purpose Service .	No other direct access roads to Bonalbo MPS.	Shallow inundation (<0.2m) from a 20%AEP, cut off in a PMF at approx 171.1mAHD.
Clarence Way	Between Bonalbo and Urbenville	Bonalbo isolated	Eastern route along Clarence Way viable before PMF	Gauge height not known
Woodenbong Road	Woodenbong Road Bridge	May disrupt main access route in and out of Bonalbo.	Nil	Overtopped in a PMF event of approximately 168.4mAHD, however shallow depths above deck. Both approaches to bridge would be overtopped in a PMF.
Urbenville and Woodenbong Sector				
Clarence Way	Between Urbenville and Woodenbong	Loss of access between both Urbenville and Woodenbong.	Nill	Inundation for up to 8 hours in the 20% AEP event and 15 hours in 1% AEP event
Clarence Way	Near Urbenville Showgrounds	Loss of access into Urbenville for areas to the east.	Nil	Not trafficable from a 5%AEP
Boomi Creek Road	East of the intersection of Boomi Creek Road and Clarence Way Road	Loss of access towards Urbenville for rural properties around Boomi Creek.	Nil	Inundation up to 15 hours during 20% AEP event and 20 hours in 1% AEP event
Lindsay Creek Road	Black Gully Culvert	Loss of access into Woodenbong/isolation for properties along Lindsay Creek Rd	Nil	Depths over road between 1m and 1.7m
Muli Muli Crescent	Muli Muli	Isolation for Muli Muli	Nil	Inundation begins from a 0.5%AEP

Clarence Way	To the North and South of Muli Muli	Loss of single road access in and out of Muli Muli	Nil	Flooded in events more frequent than a 20% AEP. Length of inundation varies from 8-
				15hours.

2.6 SUMMARY OF ISOLATED COMMUNITIES AND PROPERTIES

Table 13 lists communities liable to isolation and potential periods of isolation.
 Information presented here is based on historical information and design events and does not reflect the duration of isolation expected in larger and extreme events.
Town / Area (River Basin)	Population/ Dwellings	Flood Affect Classification	NOTES
Kyogle Sector			
Kyogle	Rural residents to the north and east of Kyogle		At 14m on the Kyogle Gauge (203900-558002) rural residents to the north and east of Kyogle are isolated (14)
Golf Course Estate	25 dwellings		Residents of the Gold Course Estate become isolated at 14.7m on the Kyogle Gauge (203900- 558002) (14)
Bonalbo and Tabulam Sector			
Bonalbo	Bonalbo township, approximately 338 people, 186 dwellings	High Trapped Perimeter	Bonalbo township becomes frequently isolated from the wider community. During events in the last 15 years including 2010 and 2011, roads such as the Clarence Way between Urbenville and Bonalbo were cut by floodwaters while much of the town remained unaffected by direct flooding (5)
Balund-a Prison (Tabulam)	Approximately 1500 inmates and staff		Becomes isolated at 7.5 m on the Tabulam Gauge (204002 – 557000) (15)
Ewingar community	Approx 70		Becomes isolated at 7.5 m on the Tabulam Gauge (204002 – 557000) (15)
Tabulam	Tabulam township, approximately 508 people, 186 dwellings	High Flood Island up until 1% AEP event.	During significant flood events, Tabulam can become isolated for a short period of time (13)

 Table 13: Potential Periods of Isolation for communities in Kyogle LGA during a Major flood.

Urbenville and Woodenbong Sector			
Urbenville	Approximately 300 people, 129 properties	High Trapped Perimeter	Up to 129 properties to the west of Urben Street and north of Beaury Street can become isolated (6)
Woodenbong		Indirectly Affected	In Woodenbong up to 184 properties are indirectly affected but is not expected to become isolated (6)

Note: Periods of isolation are a guide only. Liaison with the Local Controller and communities/residents involved is essential during periods of potential and actual isolation.

ANNEX 1: RICHMOND RIVER BASIN SCHEMATIC



CLARENCE RIVER BASIN SCHEMATIC



ANNEX 2: FACILITIES AT RISK OF FLOODING AND/OR ISOLATION

Richmond River Basin (3)

Facility Name	Street	Suburb	Comment
Schools			
Afterlee Public School	2085 – 2089 Afterlee Road	Afterlee	16 Students 2 Staff
Collins Creek School	480 Collins Valley Way	Collins Creek	14 students, 2 staff
Doubtful Creek Public School	2436 Sexonville Road	Doubtful Creek	11 students, 2 staff
Ayurveda College Pty Ltd	27 Campbell Road	Kyogle	Training Centre
Kyogle High School	189-201 Summerland Way	Kyogle	376 Students 45 Staff
Kyogle Public School	192 Summerland Way	Kyogle	315 Students 22 Staff
St Brigid's Primary School - Kyogle	22-30 Groom St	Kyogle	126 students, 20 staff
Rainbow Ridge Steiner School	279 Lillian Rock Road	Lillian Rock	94 students, 9 staff
Mummulgum Public School	5815 Bruxner Highway	Mummulgum	20 students, 2 staff
Rukenvale Public School	2303 Summerland Way	Rukenvale	14 students, 2 staff
The Risk Public School	122 Gradys Creek Road	The Risk	27 students, 2 staff
Barkers Vale Public School	4501 Kyogle Road	Wadeville	51 Students 3 Staff
Wiangaree Public School	Kunghur Street	Wiangaree	23 students, 2 staff
Child Care Centres			
Cawongla Playhouse	2474 Kyogle Rd	Kyogle	20 children, 5 staff

Eden Creek Fairymount Pre School	176 Summerland Way	Kyogle	20 children, 5 staff
Kyogle Early Learning	13 Short St	Kyogle	
Kyogle Preschool	62 Fawcett St	Kyogle	25 children, 7 staff
Bundgeam Pre School	35 Terrace Rd	Terrace Creek	20 children, 5 staff
Facilities for the aged and/or infirm			
Kyogle Memorial Multi- Purpose Service (MPS)	Summerland Way	Kyogle	12 Acute Beds / 3 Emergency Beds / 28 Aged Care Beds
The Whiddon Group – Kyogle	207 – 253 Summerland Way	Kyogle	40 Clients Staff: (0800-1700hrs)
(Aged Care Facility)			16 & 8 on Weekends / (1700-2200hrs) 6 / (2200-
			0600hrs) 2
Utilities and infrastructure			
Essential Energy Power Station	Craig St	Kyogle	02 66233393
Kyogle Substation	11 Craig St	Kyogle	
Kyogle Water Treatment Plant	1 Plant St	Kyogle	
Telstra Kyogle Exchange	153-155 Summerland Way	Kyogle	
Camping Ground / Caravan Parks			
Sheepstation Creek campground	Sheepstation Creek Road	Border Ranges National Park	Up to 75 occupants
Iron Pot Creek Campground	Murray Scrub Road	Toonumbar National Park	Up to 30 occupants
Forest Tops Campground	Tweed Scenic Drive	Tweed Ranges	Up to 9 occupants

Clarence River Basin (3)

Facility Name	Street	Suburb	Comment
Schools			
Bonalbo Pre-School	35 Woodenbong Street	Bonalbo	Hazard rating of H3 in 5% AEP event, H5 in 1% AEP event.
Bonalbo Pre-School (Jumbunna)	37 Woodenbong Street	Bonalbo	25 students, 4 staff
Bonalbo Central School (K- Y12)	Yabbra St	Bonalbo	145 students, 22 staff
Old Bonalbo Public School	Duck Creek Road	Old Banalbo	22 students, 2 staff
Tabulam Public School	Clarence Street	Tabulam	46 students, 2 staff
Woodenbong Central School	Unumgar Street	Tabulam	46 students, 8 staff
Child Care Centres			
Ngallingee Jarjum Tabulam & District Community Pre- School	3 Barnes St	Tabulam	20 children, 5 staff
Facilities for the aged and/or infirm			
Bonalbo Multi-Purpose Service (MPS)	Hospital Rd	Bonalbo	
Uniting Caroona Bonalbo	61 Woodenbong Rd	Bonalbo	
Urbenville Multi-Purpose Service	45 Beaury St	Urbenville	
Utilities and infrastructure			
Bonalbo Substation	13 Peacock St	Bonalbo	
Mallanganee Substation	6679 Bruxner Hwy	Mallanganee	

Urbenville Substation	Cnr. of Clarence Way & Boomi Creek Rd	Urbenville	
Urbenville Water Treatment Plant	87 Tooloom Falls Rd	Urbenville	Note: There is approximately 17km of water pipeline associated with the Tooloom Falls Road Water Plant Facility.
			4Km Water Pipeline from Tooloom Falls Road Water Plant Facility to Urbenville. 13km Water Pipeline from Urbenville to Woodenbong.
Bonalbo Water Treatment Plant	5 High St	Bonalbo	
Camping Ground / Caravan Parks			
Tooloom Falls Campground	Bandahngan Loop	Bandahngan Aboriginal Area	Temporarily closed. Normally up to 51 occupants
Peacock Creek Campground	Peacock Creek Road	Peacock Creek	Up to 21 occupants

MAP 1: RICHMOND RIVER BASIN



MAP 2: CLARENCE RIVER BASIN



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MAP 3: KYOGLE TOWN MAP



MAP 4: BONALBO TOWN MAP



MAP 5: TABULAM TOWN MAP



MAP 6: URBENVILLE TOWN MAP



MAP 7: WOODENBONG TOWN MAP



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KYOGLE FLOOD WARNING SYSTEMS AND ARRANGEMENTS

Chapter 1 of Volume 3 (NSW SES Response Arrangements for Kyogle) of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan

Last Update: July 2024



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1. GAUGES MONITORED BY THE NSW SES KYOGLE AND TABULAM LOCAL HEADQUARTERS

Table 1: Gauges monitored by the NSW SES Kyogle and Tabulam Local Headquarters

Gauge Name	Туре	AWRC No.	Bureau Gauge No.	Stream	Flood level classification in metres		fication	on Special Reading Arrangements	Owner
					MIN	MOD	MAJ		
Wiangaree *†‡	Automatic	203005	558001	Richmond River	11	16	NA	-	Water NSW
Kyogle*†‡	Automatic	203900	558002	Richmond River	12	14.4	16	-	Water NSW
Tabulam ‡	Automatic	204002	557000	Clarence River	-	-	-	-	Water NSW

Notes: The Bureau of Meteorology provides flood warnings for the gauges marked with an asterisk (*).

NSW SES Local Flood Advices are provided for the gauges marked with a single cross (†).

The NSW SES holds a Flood Intelligence Card for the gauges marked with a double cross (‡)

2. DISSEMINATION OPTIONS FOR NSW SES FLOOD INFORMATION AND WARNING PRODUCTS

As the combat agency for flood, storm and tsunami, NSW SES has a statutory responsibly to issue warnings and public information to affected communities (NSW SES Act s 8). Warnings include advice about options and likely impacts of an event. The Incident Controller is accountable for preparing and disseminating accurate warning products during an incident.

2.1 DISSEMINATION OF WARNINGS:

NSW SES disseminates warnings through the following platforms: (Please note that this is not an exhaustive list and not all the following may be used during any or all events)

- NSW SES Website
 - o <u>www.ses.nsw.gov.au</u>
- HazardWatch
 - HazardWatch is currently online at <u>www.hazardwatch.gov.au</u>.
 - Warnings are automatically updated/removed as managed through this platform.
- Hazards Near Me NSW App
- Doorknocking
- Emergency Alert
- Social Media
 - The following are some social media accounts:
 - Facebook (@NSWSES)
 - Facebook (@Northern Rivers NSW SES)
 - Facebook (@Kyogle NSW SES)
 - Facebook (@Urbenville NSW SES)
 - Facebook (@Tabulam NSW SES)
 - Facebook (local community pages, local business pages)
 - Twitter (@NSWSES)
 - Instagram (@NSWSES)
- Community Meetings

Television Stations:

Station	Location
ABC TV (Channel 2, 20 & 21)	Northern NSW
ABC NEWS, (Channel 24)	Northern NSW
NBN (Channel 8, 81)	Northern NSW
SBS (Channel 3)	Northern NSW
WIN/10 (Channel 5)	Northern NSW
Seven West (Channel 6, 61)	Northern NSW
SkyNews (Channel 53)	Northern NSW

Radio Stations:

Station	Location	Frequency	Modulation
ABC Radio	North Coast	738 AM	
		94.5 FM	
2LM	Kyogle	104 FM	
Vision Christian Radio	Woodenbong	87.6 FM	Vision Christian Radio

Digital/On-Line Services

- Streaming Services
- Podcasts
- YouTube Channels

Other Agencies:

Stakeholders include:

- Kyogle Council
- Tenterfield Council
- Chamber of Commerce
- Business Owners
- Not for Profit Organisations
- NDIS and Community Care Providers
- Aged Care Providers
- Emergency Services
- Schools and Child Care
- NSW Health
- Media Outlets
- Australian Red Cross
- Others where appropriate



KYOGLE: NSW SES LOCALITY RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS

Chapter 2 of Volume 3 (NSW SES Response Arrangements for Kyogle) of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan

Last Update: July 2024



AUTHORISATION

NSW SES Locality Response Arrangements in Kyogle has been prepared by the NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES) as part of a comprehensive planning process.

Approved

En

NSE SES North Eastern Zone Acting Coordinator Planning (Elena Palamara)

Date: 02/07/2024

Approved

NSW SES North Eastern Acting Deputy Zone Commander (Lacy Loloa)

Date: 02/07/2024

Tabled at LEMC

Date: 02/07/2024

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SECTOR OVERVIEW

These Sectors provide further detail of the planned response strategies within Communities in the Kyogle LGA.

Table 1: Overview of Sectors in the Kyogle LGA.

Sector Name	Community	Sector Basis	Total properties	Properties potentially at risk
Kyogle	Kyogle	Rising Road Access	Kyogle: 3144	146
Bonalbo	Bonalbo, Tabulam	Rising Road Access in township, Low Flood Island to the south	Bonalbo: 216 Tabulam: 225	Bonalbo: 101 Tabulam: 225
Urbenville	Woodenbong, Urbenville	Woodenbong is largely a High Trapped Perimeter Urbenville has High Trapped Perimeters with some Rising Road Access	Woodenbong: 196 Urbenville: 168	Woodenbong: 4 Urbenville: 30

1. KYOGLE SECTOR

1.1. KYOGLE RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS

Refer to Volume 2: Hazard and Risk in Kyogle for more information about this Sector.

Sector Description Hazard Flood Affect Classification	 The Kyogle Sector is located within the Richmond River Basin, bordering Queensland to the north, Tweed Shire and Lismore City to the east and the Richmond Valley and Clarence Valley to the south. The main population centre of Kyogle has a population of 2804 people living in 1147 dwellings. It has an Indigenous population of 5.6%. Riverine flooding from the Richmond River and backflow from Fawcetts Creek. Kyogle township is largely classified as Rising Road Access Eastern Kyogle township is a High Flood Island Geneva has Rising Road Access Central Wiangaree is a Low Flood Island and Eastern Wiangaree is Indirectly Affected Rural areas in this Sector are largely Low Flood Islands 				
At risk properties	146 Total number of properties within Sector/Community 3144				
Sector Control	The Incident Controller will nominate a Sector Commander to control evacuations in this Sector. The NSW SES will conduct evacuations in this sector with assistance from NSW Police, Fire and Rescue NSW, and NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) volunteers.				
Key Warning Gauge Name	Name	AWRC No.	Min (m)	Mod (m)	Maj (m)
	WiangareeKyogle	203005 203900	11 12	15.5 14.4	- 16
General Strategy	 Evacuation of at-risk population. Self-evacuation to friends/family outside of the impact area. Establishment of an Assembly Area/Evacuation Centre at Kyogle Memorial Hall where evacuees are able to gather while flood situation is monitored. 				
Key Risks / Consequences	 Closure of evacuation routes. Inundation of a large number of dwellings. Potential of isolation to supplies for hundreds of people in a large flood event for a number of days. Potential loss of life from rapid and potentially high velocity flooding inundation. 				
Information and Warnings	 Flood Watch (BoM) Flood Warnings (BoM) AWS Advice AWS Watch and Act AWS Emergency Warning Sequenced door knocking of evacuation sector for urban areas Media announcements (including social media) 				

	Emergency Alerts (SMS, landlines)		
	Standard Emergency Warning Signal		
	• A local tree phone exists may be able to share warnings in rural areas via a phone tree. The Kyogle SES Unit holds these contacts details.		
Property	Specific property protection measures:		
Protection	Relocation of livestock.		
	 Relocation of farm machinery and valuable goods. 		
	Monitoring rising flood waters.		
	Control of surface water through sandbagging measures.		
	Assistance with property protection:		
	Refer to Chapter 4: Caravan Park Arrangements.		
	 Self-serve sandbagging station may be set up at a nominated location to assist with property protection. 		
	Protection of essential infrastructure:		
	 No identified essential infrastructure requires protection below a 1% Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) flood height. 		
	 The Chauvel Street Sewage Pumping Station and Kyogle Raw Water Pumping Station may be affected from a 0.2% AEP event with greater impact for water and sewerage infrastructure during a PMF event. 		
	Council will manage any required infrastructure protection.		
Evacuation and/or	r Evacuation may be considered due to;		
Isolation Triggers	Inundation of property.		
	Closure of primary evacuation routes.		
	Failure of essential services.		
Evacuation and/or isolation Triggers	 All effects listed below associated with gauge heights will need to be monitored and verified via reconnaissance wherever possible and should not be considered as absolute. 		
	Evacuation or warnings will be considered when:		
	Wiangaree		
	 Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 11m at Wiangaree Gauge: Local roads in Wiangaree in the vicinity of the Richmond River may be affected at this height (Subsector Wiangaree West). 		
	Note that a height of 12.25m at the Wiangaree gauge can result in river heights of 15.5-15.8m at the Kyogle Gauge approximately 6-8 hours later, dependent on level of rainfall, and may provide additional warning time for Kyogle.		
	• The area north of Wiangaree has experienced historical flooding and local roads may be impacted at this height (Subsector Upper Wiangaree).		
	Kyogle		
	1.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 5-10m at Kyogle Gauge: Possible inundation and isolation of low-lying farmland (Subsectors Cedar Point and Rural).		

	2.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 13-13.5m at Kyogle Gauge: Summerland Way at the intersection with Kyogle Road may be cut at this height, compromising the evacuation route for the Kyogle Caravan Park. At 14m water may encroach on the Kyogle Caravan Park which is predicted to be completely inundated at 14.5m (Subsector Kyogle North).
	 The rural area north of Kyogle township and east of Summerland Way may become indirectly affected at this height (Subsector Kyogle Rural).
	• The low-lying industrial area south of Fawcetts Creek is predicted to have above floor inundation at 14.5m, however the main evacuation route may be cut at 13.5m (Subsector Low Lying Kyogle) and is known locally as the bottom end of town.
	3.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 14m at Kyogle Gauge: Kyogle Road at the Fawcetts Plain Road turnoff may be cut at this height isolating residents to the north and east of Kyogle (Subsectors Fawcetts Plain Road and Kyogle North East).
	4.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 14.7m at Kyogle Gauge: The housing estate north of the Golf Course may become isolated at this height (Subsector Golf Course Estate). In a PMF event this area may have some above ground inundation on the fringes predicted at approx. 21.5m.
	 Approximately seven hours after this height is reached, Reynolds Bridge may be cut, preventing access to Lismore via Summerland Way and Bentley Road (Subsector Cedar Point and Rural).
	5.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 15.2m at Kyogle Gauge: Rural properties downstream of Kyogle may be affected at approximately this height during a 20% AEP event (Subsector Kyogle South).
	 During a PMF event, properties to north of Willow Lane and east of Summerland Way to the south of Merrigan Street be inundated (Subsector Kyogle South).
	6.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 15.5-15.8m at Kyogle Gauge: Low-lying houses in Fawcett Street may be affected at this height, however the main evacuation route may be compromised at 13m. Alternative use of local roads for evacuation may be possible (Subsector Fawcett Street). During a PMF event this above floor inundation may extend to include Moore Street, Webbs Lane and Kyogle Road.
	 The Kyogle Levee protecting "The Flats" is predicted to overtop at this height, impacting 60 properties behind the levee. In a PMF event inundation may extend east of the rail line.
	7.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 18.1m at Kyogle Gauge: During a 2% AEP event, approximately 18.1m, two properties south of Crotty Lane may experience above floor inundation. Western Kyogle is largely outside of modelled flood extents and has Rising Road Access to the west (Subsector Kyogle West).
Sequencing of evacuation and/or warnings	• Evacuation of vulnerable facilities such as the hospital, aged care facilities, schools, and child-care facilities will require a higher priority. In Kyogle township these facilities are all above historical or modelled flood extents.
	Wiangaree
	• For Prediction 1: Unit to conduct doorknocking in Wiangaree to advise of isolation. Watch and Act do not enter floodwater messaging for Subsector Wiangaree West (GEMS ID 59086) if heights expected to reach or exceed 11m at the Wiangaree gauge.

	 Watch and Act do not enter floodwater messaging should be issued for subsector Upper Wiangaree (GEMS ID 93359) upon receipt of a Minor flood warning for the Wiangaree Gauge.
	Kyogle
	• For Prediction 1: Watch and Act prepare to isolate messaging for Subsector Cedar Point and Rural (GEMS ID 59088) if heights are expected to reach or exceed 10m at the Kyogle gauge.
	• For Prediction 2: Emergency Warning evacuation messaging in Subsector Kyogle North (GEMS ID 59078) if heights expected to reach or exceed 13.5m at the Kyogle gauge.
	 Watch and Act evacuation messaging for Subsector Low Lying Kyogle (GEMS ID 18) if heights expected to reach 13.5m, and Emergency Warning evacuation messaging if heights are expected to reach or exceed 14.5m with evacuation occurring before evacuation route is cut at 13.5m at the Kyogle gauge.
	• Watch and Act prepare to isolate messaging for Subsector Kyogle Rural (GEMS ID 59087) if heights are predicted to reach or exceed 13m at the Kyogle gauge.
	• For Prediction 3: Watch and Act isolation messaging for Subsectors Fawcetts Plain Road (GEMS ID 59084) and Kyogle North East (GEMS ID 53612, 70626) if heights are expected to reach or exceed 14m at the Kyogle gauge.
	• For Prediction 4: Watch and Act isolation messaging for Subsector Golf Course Estate (GEMS ID 59080) if heights are expected to reach or exceed 14.7m at the Kyogle gauge.
	• For Prediction 5: Watch and Act do not enter floodwater messaging for Subsector Kyogle South (GEMS ID 59079) if heights are expected to reach 15.2m at the Kyogle gauge.
	• Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for Subsector Kyogle South (GEMS ID 59079) for properties north of Willow Lane and east of Summerland Way to the south of Merrigan Street heights are expected to reach or exceed 21.5m at the Kyogle gauge during a PMF event.
	• For Prediction 6: Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for Subsector Fawcett Street (GEMS ID 73544) if heights expected to reach or exceed 15.5m at the Kyogle gauge.
	 Emergency Warning evacuation for Subsector The Flats (GEMS ID 19) messaging if heights expected to reach or exceed 15.5m at the Kyogle gauge.
	• For Prediction 7: Watch and Act do not enter floodwater for Crotty Lane within Subsector Kyogle West (GEMS ID 59076) if heights are expected to reach or exceed 18.1m at the Kyogle gauge. Evacuation of the identified properties may be required on a case -by-case basis.
Evacuation Routes	 Kyogle Memorial Hall: Kyogle Campgrounds - Summerland Way - Stratheden Street - Kyogle Memorial Hall.
	 The Flats: Anzac Drive - Ettrick Street - Geneva Street -Summerland Way – Stratheden Street - Kyogle Memorial Hall.
	• Fawcett Street : Fawcett Street - Kyogle Road - Summerland Way Stratheden Street - Kyogle Memorial Hall.
	• Willow Lane: Willow Lane – Summerland Way - Stratheden Street – Kyogle Memorial Hall.
Evacuation Route	Road closures which may affect evacuation routes:
Closure	• Anzac Drive: 15.5m at the Kyogle gauge, at the intersection with McDougall Street.

	• Summerland Way: 13.5m at the Kyogle gauge, at the intersection with Kyogle Road. May also close at Railway Viaduct north of Fawcetts Creek at 14.5m, however evacuation route is cut at 13.5m.	
Method of	Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground.	
Evacuation	Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas.	
Evacuation	Kyogle Memorial Hall, Evacuation, Stratheden Street.	
Centre/Assembly Point	Kyogle High School, Assembly Area, 19 Summerland Way.	
Large scale evacuations	• When large-scale evacuations are likely, the NSW SES Incident Commander will liaise with the LEOCON and request support of the EOC as required. Large scale evacuations would be unlikely in this sector but if required additional locations will be identified.	
	 Additional locations may be identified in large scale evacuations, or if existing evacuation centres are flood affected or isolated. 	
	Assembly areas may be utilised on higher ground.	
Rescue	 The flood rescue management process adopted will be determined by the Incident Controller, based on the scale of the flood rescue operations. The Incident Controller may declare a flood rescue area of operations and establish a flood cell to assist with the management of flood rescues. Flood Rescue Operations will be undertaken as per the State Rescue Policy. 	
	• Once The Flats have become inundated, high velocity flows would make rescue by boat dangerous and unfeasible. Evacuation should occur before The Flats have become inundated.	
Resupply	• If resupply is required, it will be provided by the NSW SES through the 132500 call out system.	
	 Airdrops may be required when access via boat to isolated areas becomes unviable. 	
	 Resupply may be required for rural properties upstream and downstream of Kyogle depending on period of isolation. 	
	Table 13, in Volume 2 provides information about isolated communities in the Kyogle Council area and potential periods of isolation.	
Aircraft Management	Helicopter Landing Points:	
	There are no designated helicopter landing points in this sector. However, NSW SES has identified the following the possible location for a helicopter landing point. Ground truthing of this site is recommended prior to activation:	
	• Kyogle School S 28° 37′ 32″ E 153° 0′ 03″	
	- Firm all weather surface	
	 Wires running parallel to railway tracks 	
	Additional landing points are maybe located at:	
	Dr David Reid Park – Southern side of Hospital	
	28.6286° S 153.0019° E	

	<i>Airports:</i> There are no airports in this sector. The nearest airport is located in Casino in the Richmond Valley LGA.		
Other	 Special considerations relating to evacuation: Closure of schools - coordinated through the Department of Education and Training. The evacuation of domestic animals, horses and livestock to the appropriate facility to be managed by Department of Primary Industries and Local Land Services. Closure of licensed premises. All hotels and licensed clubs will be closed if required. Security. Police patrols to be established to maintain law and order after evacuation has occurred. The NSW SES will use flood boats, aircraft, community contacts and other agencies to monitor the safety of individuals, where feasible. These arrangements will stay in place until the "Return with Caution" is provided by the NSW SES to residents to return to their premises. 		

1.2. KYOGLE COMMUNITY MAP

July 2024



1.3. KYOGLE EVACUATION PLANNING

July 2024



2. BONALBO SECTOR

2.1. BONALBO RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS

Refer to Volume 2: Hazard and Risk in Kyogle for more information about this Sector.

Sector Description	• The Bonalbo Sector is located within the Clarence River Basin, to the west of Kyogle Sector and southeast of the Urbenville Sector. Larger villages within the sector include Bonalbo and Tabulam, as well as numerous smaller settlements.				
Hazard	 Bonalbo is subject to two forms of flooding, riverine flooding from Peacock Creek as well as overland flows from the smaller catchments which drain though the town. Tabulam is susceptible to riverine flooding from the Clarence River, while the Timbarra River, a major tributary which joins the Clarence River 2km downstream of Tabulam may contribute with backwater flooding from its own catchment. The Tabulam Rivulet located immediately north of the village may also contribute to flooding. Mallanganee is subject to flooding from the Little Creek catchment upstream as well influence from the breakout flows from the larger southern flow path. 				
Flood Affect Classification	 Bonalbo is a Low Flood Island in the south, Indirectly Affected Area in the north, High Trapped Perimeter to the east and west, and has Rising Road and Access and Overland Escape Routes through the town. Old Bonalbo is a High Flood Island. Tabulam is a Low Flood Island excepting a High Flood Island to the west of Tabulam Public School. Mallanganee is Low Flood Island with Rising Road Access, with a High Flood Island on the eastern side of the village. 				
At risk properties	326 Total number of properties within Sector/Community 734				
Sector Control	The Incident Controller will nominate a Sector Commander to control evacuations in this Sector. The NSW SES will conduct evacuations in this sector with assistance from NSW Police, Fire and Rescue NSW, and NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) volunteers.				
Key Warning Gauge Name	Name	AWRC No.	Min (m)	Mod (m)	Maj (m)
	Tabulam Gauge	204002	-	-	-
General Strategy	 Evacuation of at-risk population. Self-evacuation to friends/family outside of the impact area. Establishment of an Assembly Area/Evacuation Centre at Tabulam Rural Fire Brigade where evacuees are able to gather while flood situation is monitored. 				
Key Risks / Consequences	 Inundation of a large number of dwellings. Potential of isolation to supplies for thousands of people in a large flood event for a number of days. Potential loss of life from rapid and potentially high velocity flooding inundation. 				

Information and Warnings	 AWS Advice AWS Watch and Act AWS Emergency Warning Sequenced door knocking of evacuation sector Media announcements (including social media) Emergency Alerts (SMS, landlines) Standard Emergency Warning Signal 	
Property Protection	Specific property protection measures:	
,	Relocation of livestock.	
	 Relocation of farm machinery and valuable goods. 	
	 Monitoring rising flood waters. 	
	 Control of surface water through sandbagging measures. 	
	 Monitoring integrity of dwellings surrounded by flood waters. 	
	Assistance with property protection:	
	Refer to Chapter 4: Caravan Park Arrangements	
	Protection of essential infrastructure:	
	• No identified essential infrastructure requires protection below a 1% Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) flood height.	
Evacuation and/or	Evacuation may be considered due to;	
Isolation Triggers	Inundation of property.	
	Closure of main evacuation routes.	
	Failure of essential services	
Evacuation and/or isolation Triggers	Tabulam	
	Evacuation and warnings will be considered when:	
	 Note that a number of properties in areas north of Tabulam along Tabulam Road and south of Tabulam adjoining the Clarence River (Subsectors Northern Tabulam and Southern Tabulam) are within the modelled flood extent and may require evacuation. 	
	1.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 5m at the Tabulam Gauge: The community of Ewingar with population of approximately 70 and the Balund-a Tabulam Prison with approximately 101 residents and staff may become isolated at 7.5m at the Tabulam gauge (Subsector Ewingar and the Balund-a Prison). This may require early isolation advice from 5m, if heights are expected to reach or exceed 7.5m. This area is within the Clarence Valley LGA but would likely be inaccessible for the Copmanhurst SES Unit due to flooding of the Clarence and Mann River systems.	
	2.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 10m at the Tabulam Gauge: Jubullum Village, located in Tenterfield Shire, may become isolated from this height (Subsector Jubullum Village).	
	 At 11.5m water begins to enter the lower parts of the village with some over ground flooding at 11.95m, with the first house in the southern part of Tabulam predicted to be inundated at approximately 12.5m. This area may 	
require evacuation at 10m, if heights are expected to reach or exceed 11.95m (Subsector Tabulam South East).		

 Tabulam Racecourse may become isolated from this height with Racecourse Road potentially being cut from 10.29m (Subsector Tabulam Racecourse). 		
 3.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 14.6m at the Tabulam Gauge: During the flood of record in 1976, low-lying properties were inundated at a height of 16.15m. At 16.32m approximately half the properties north and south of the Bruxner Highway may be inundated above floor level at 16.32 (Subsectors Tabulam North and Tabulam South). Evacuation routes westbound along the Bruxner Highway will likely be cut at this height. Evacuation may be required by 14.6m, if heights are expected to reach or exceed 16.15m. 4.) Prediction to reach and/ or exceed 16.99m at the Tabulam Gauge: The area of high ground in the visibility of Tabulam Road and the Bruxner Highway. 		
(Subsector Tabulam Centre) remains a High Flood Island at this height approximately equivalent to a 1% AEP event. However, if a PMF event is predicted, this area would require evacuation concurrently with adjoining Subsectors Tabulam North and Tabulam South.		
For other parts of the Bonalbo Sector, evacuation or warnings may be based on expected road inundation of main access road low points and/or overland flooding. Therefore, evacuation or warnings may be considered following monitoring and/or reconnaissance of the areas identified below;		
Bonalbo At Bonalbo, flooding comes from both local overland flows and riverine flooding from		
Peacock Creek.		
 During a 20% AEP event flows from Peacock Creek typically remain in the channel and the majority of flooding within the Bonalbo township is from the overland flows coming from the town catchment. Depths are typically shallow and less than 300 mm however some localised areas of high hazard and floodways can occur in particular on Koreelah Street between Sandilands and Capeen Streets (Subsector Bonalbo A). 		
 Floodwaters may cross Woodenbong Road and flow across properties along Lunar Lane (Subsector Bonalbo B). 		
• The area south of Peacock St, including the Bonalbo Preschool may be isolated earlier in an event, then progressively inundated (Subsector Bonalbo A).		
 A small number of rural properties in the vicinity of Peacock Creek along Clarence Way and Farm Road <i>may</i> become isolated due to local road closures. Desktop review indicates one property on Clarance Way is within the PMF, extent, but high ground outside the PMF extent is located to the south of this property (Subsector Peacock Creek). 		
2) During 1% AEP event Peacock Creek spills into the floodplain downstream of the Woodenbong Bridge at the Bowling Club and Tourist Park and Camping ground following the natural flood runner and becomes the dominant source of flooding at the south-eastern end of the town (Subsector Bonalbo B).		
 Areas east of Peacock Street and south of Woodenbong Road are susceptible to overbank flooding of Peacock Creek. 		
3) During a PMF event, floodwaters from Peacock Creek extend slightly north of Woodenbong Road, and south of Sandilands Street and east of Dyraaba Street and east of Peacock Street. Depths become significant in this area and are in excess of 1m up to more than 5m south of the town (Subsector Bonalbo B).		

	Mallanganee				
	 At Mallanganee, flooding may occur from the Little Creek catchment upstream as well influence from the breakout flows from the larger southern flow path. 1) During a 10% AEP event, properties north of Sandilands Street are generally unaffected excepting one property between on the eastern side of Pine Street however, may be affected (Subsector Mallanganee North). 				
	Old Bonalbo				
	Old Bonalbo township is located on high ground and has not historically been susceptible to flooding but may become isolated for a number of days (Subsector Old Bonalbo).				
Sequencing of	Tabulam Sequencing				
warnings and/ or evacuations	 Evacuation of vulnerable facilities such as the hospital, aged care facilities, schools, and child-care facilities will require a higher priority. 				
	 Properties in the areas north of Tabulam along Tabulam Road and south of Tabulam adjoining the Clarence River, in Subsectors Northern Tabulam (GEMS 93367) and Southern Tabulam (GEMS ID 95098) are within the modelled flood extent and may require evacuation on a case-by-case basis. 				
	• For Prediction 1: Watch and Act prepare to isolate messaging for Subsector Ewingar and the Balund-a Prison (GEMS ID 51205) at 5m at the Tabulam gauge if heights expected to reach or exceed 7.5m.				
	• For Prediction 2: Liaison with Northwest Zone regarding messaging for Subsector Jubullum Village (GEMS ID 91331), located in Tenterfield Shire, if heights are expected to reach or exceed 10m.				
	 Watch and Act prepare to evacuate messaging for Subsector Tabulam Southeast (GEMS ID 72732) if heights are expected reach or exceed 10m, and Emergency Warning evacuation messaging if heights are expected to reach or exceed 11.5m. 				
	• Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for Subsector Tabulam Racecourse (GEMS ID 93358) if heights are expected to reach or exceed 10.29m. Alternatively, high ground northwest of the racecourse is outside of the PMF extent for campers at the racecourse.				
	 For Prediction 3: Watch and Act prepare to evacuate messaging for Subsectors Tabulam North (GEMS ID 59068) and Tabulam South (GEMS ID 59069) if heights are expected reach or exceed 14.6m, and Emergency Warning evacuation messaging if heights are expected to reach or exceed 16.15m. 				
	• For Prediction 4: Watch and Act isolation messaging for Subsector Tabulam Central (GEMS ID 59067) if heights not expected to reach 16.99m.				
	 If heights are expected to reach or exceed 16.99m, Emergency Warning evacuation messaging concurrently with Prediction 3 of at 16.15m, before evacuation route is compromised. 				
	Bonalbo Sequencing				
	• For Predictions 1: Watch and Act do not enter floodwater messaging for Subsector Bonalbo A (GEMS ID 59070) during periods of sustained rainfall. The area south of Peacock St, including the Bonalbo Preschool may be isolated earlier in an event, then progressively inundated, and Emergency Warning messaging may be required if heights are expected to rise. Active monitoring				
	of this area is recommended.				

	 Watch & Act Prepare to isolate for areas along Clarence Way and Farm Road adjoining Peacock Creek, Subsector Peacock Creek (GEMS ID 93365). Localised road closures may occur from a 20% AEP event. Due to limited intelligence in this area, field monitoring and verification is recommended. During a PMF event, Emergency Warning move to higher ground messaging for the property located on Clarence Way. For Prediction 2-3: Watch and Act evacuation messaging for Subsectors Bonalbo A (GEMS ID 59070) and Bonalbo B (GEMS ID 59071) may need to be considered if levels equivalent to a 1% AEP event are likely and monitoring indicates imminent inundation of Koreelah Street, Tooloom Street and Woodenbong Road.
	Old Bonalbo Sequencing
	 Watch and Act isolation messaging for Subsector Old Bonalbo (GEMS ID 59093) during periods of predicted sustained and heavy rainfall.
	Mallanganee Sequencing
	• Watch and Act do not enter floodwater messaging for Subsector Mallanganee North (GEMS ID 59262) if monitoring indicates rising water levels from Little Creek in the vicinity of Sandilands St and Pine St.
Evacuation Routes	Bonalbo Evacuation Route: Peacock St – Yabbra St.
	 Bonalbo Evacuation Route 2: Sandilands St – Koreelah St - Woodenbong Road – Yabbra St.
	• Tabulam Evacuation Route: Racecourse Road – Court St – Lawrence St.
	Tabulam Alternate Evacuation Route: Bruxner Highway – Casino evacuation centres.
Evacuation Route	Road closures which may affect evacuation routes:
Closure	 Bonalbo Evacuation Route: Koreelah St may be cut between Capeen St and Sandilands St during a 20% AEP event, requiring use of Capeen St to access evacuation route.
	• Tabulam Alternate evacuation route: May be affected by closures along the Bruxner Highway towards Casino, including but not limited to; east of the Sextonville Road intersection at 15.1m at Casino Road Bridge gauge, Centre St intersection with Lennox St at 13.8m at Casino Road Bridge gauge and additional road closures on Centre St.
Method of	Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground.
Evacuation	 Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas.
Evacuation	Bonalbo Central School, Yabbra St.
Centre/Assembly	• Tabulam Rural Fire Brigade, Lawrence St, Tabulam (within 1% flood extent).
	 Tabulam, alternative evacuation to Casino Evacuation Centres. If this option is likely to be required due to predicted flood heights, it should occur early in a flood event before roads are compromised.
Large scale evacuations	• When large-scale evacuations are likely, the NSW SES Incident Commander will liaise with the LEOCON and request support of the EOC as required. Large scale evacuations would be unlikely in this sector but if required additional locations will be identified.

	• Additional locations may be identified in large scale evacuations, or if existing evacuation centres are flood affected or isolated.
	 Assembly areas may be utilised on higher ground.
Rescue	 The flood rescue management process adopted will be determined by the Incident Controller, based on the scale of the flood rescue operations. The Incident Controller may declare a flood rescue area of operations and establish a flood cell to assist with the management of flood rescues. Rescue hotspots include Planes Station Road, Tabulam.
Resupply	 During significant flood events, Tabulam, Old Bonalbo and Bonalbo can become isolated for a short period of time.
	 If resupply is required, it will be provided by the NSW SES through the 132500 call out system.
	Table 23, in Volume 2 provides information about isolated communities in the Kyogle Council area and potential periods of isolation.
Aircraft Management	Helicopter Landing Points:
	There are no designated helicopter landing points in this sector. However, NSW SES has identified the following the possible location for a helicopter landing point. Ground truthing of this site is recommended prior to activation:
	• Tabulam Sports Ground S 28° 53' 24" E 153° 34' 05"
	 May become inundated in a 1% event which is approximately 17.4m Local Datum.
	 Concrete cricket pitch in centre of oval Goal posts either end of oval
	- Notes: Caution can be quite soft after significant rain
	- Last Surveyed: December 2013
	Airports:
	• There are no airports in this sector. The nearest airport is located in Casino in the Richmond Valley LGA.
Other	Special considerations relating to evacuation:
	 Closure of schools - coordinated through the Department of Education and Training. The evacuation of domestic animals, horses and livestock to the appropriate facility to be managed by Department of Primary Industries and Local Land Services. Closure of licensed premises. All hotels and licensed clubs will be closed if required.
	 required. Security. Police patrols to be established to maintain law and order after evacuation has occurred. The NSW SES will use flood boats, aircraft, community contacts and other
	 agencies to monitor the safety of individuals, where feasible. These arrangements will stay in place until the "Return with Caution" is provided by the NSW SES to residents to return to their premises.

2.2. BONALBO COMMUNITY MAP



2.3. TABULAM COMMUNITY MAP

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2.4. BONALBO EVACUATION PLANNING

July 2024

2.5. TABULAM EVACUATION PLANNING

3. URBENVILLE SECTOR

3.1. URBENVILLE RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS

Refer to Volume 2: Hazard and Risk in Kyogle Council for more information about this Sector/Community.

Sector Description	 Whilst Urbenville is situated withi Unit operates as part of the Richn operations in Urbenville and Woo Woodenbong has a population of Urbenville has a population of 333 Muli Muli has a population of 90 p 	in the Tenterfield S nond Tweed Regio odenbong. 5390 people living 1 people living in 1 people living in 29	Shire, the n to mar in 174 dv 41 dwell dwelling	Urbenville age flood vellings. ings. s.	SES
Hazard	 Woodenbong Overland Flooding Urbenville Overland flooding from local catcl Riverine flooding from Tooloom C 	hments. Creek and its tribut	aries.		
Flood Affect Classification	 Woodenbong Majority of town is Indirectly Affe Some Rising Road Access out of th Woodenbong Campground and sy Urbenville: North side of town has Rising Roa Vicinity of the hospital is a High Tr Urbenville Showground and Camp Muli Muli: Western Muli Muli is a Low Flood Eastern Muli Muli is a High Trapped 	ected. ne flood extent. wimming pool are nd Access. rapped Perimeter. ping Ground is a Lo Island. ed Perimeter.	Low Floc	d Islands. Island.	
At risk properties	 Over floor flooding for properties north of Unumgar St and Dalmorton St in Woodenbong. Over floor flooding for properties on Tooloom St in Urbenville. 	Total number of properties withi Sector/Commun	n iity	Woodenbo Urbenville	ong: 196 : 168
Sector Control	The Incident Controller will nominate a Sector Commander to control evacuations in this Sector. The NSW SES will conduct evacuations in this sector with assistance from NSW Police, Fire and Rescue NSW, and NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) volunteers.				
Key Warning Gauge Name	Name There are no key warning gauges in this sector.	AWRC No.	Min (m)	Mod (m)	Maj (m)

General Strategy	Evacuation of at-risk population.
Concrat officiency	 Self-evacuation to friends/family outside of the impact area.
	 Establishment of an Assembly Area/Evacuation Centre at Woodenbong Hall and Urbenville Hall where evacuees are able to gather while flood situation is monitored.
	• Rescue
	Resupply
Key Risks / Consequences	 Closure of evacuation routes Inundation of some dwellings. Potential of isolation to supplies for hundreds of people in a large flood event for a number of days.
Information and Warnings	 AWS Advice AWS Watch and Act AWS Emergency Warning Sequenced door knocking of evacuation sector Media announcements (including social media) Emergency Alerts (SMS, landlines) Standard Emergency Warning Signal
Property Protection	 Specific property protection measures: Relocation of livestock. Relocation of farm machinery and valuable goods. Control of surface water through sandbagging measures. Assist in the lifting of furniture to residents in need. Monitoring integrity of dwellings surrounded by flood waters. Assistance with property protection: Refer to Chapter 4: Caravan Park Arrangements Protection of essential infrastructure: Some essential infrastructure may require protection: Urbenville Water Treatment Plan
Evacuation and/or Isolation Triggers	 Evacuation may be considered due to; Inundation of property. Likely isolation of significant number of properties in Urbenville and Woodenbong. Closure of primary evacuation routes.
Evacuation and/or Isolation Triggers	 Evacuation or warnings will be considered when: For the Urbenville Sector, evacuation and/or warning sequencing is based on expected road inundation of main access road low points and/or overland flooding. Therefore, evacuation or warnings may be considered following monitoring and/or reconnaissance of the areas identified below;

Woodenbo	ng
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At Woodenbong, flooding is affected by local overland flows due to the terrain and Woodenbong sitting on a high point in comparison to Tooloom Creek.

- During a 20% AEP event, floodwaters from Toolom Creek may exceed the capacity of the creek channel inundating the sports field, showground and Woodenbong Campground. Local catchment flows may also cause above ground inundation along Richmond Street and Mount Lindsay Road may become inundated to the east of Richmond Street intersection (Subsector Woodenbong B).
- A number of properties north of Woodenbong along Lindsay Creek Road *may* become isolated during a 20% AEP event due to local road closures in the vicinity of Recreation Road but are not predicted to be inundated (Subsector Woodenbong A).
- Lindsay Creek Road *may* experience inundation during a 20% AEP event, isolating a number of properties located further north along Lindsay Creek Road but are not predicted to be inundated (Subsector Lindsay Creek).
- Clarence Way between Woodenbong and Urbenville may experience overtopping at numerous points during a 20% AEP event for up to 8 hours and for up to 15 hours during a 1% AEP event. During a PMF event most of Clarence Way is overtopped (Subsector Tooloom Creek).
- Flooding occurs northwest of Woodenbong in the Tenterfield LGA from Grahams Creek. Heavy rainfall such as that experienced in 2010 (133mm over 2 days) may cause the Grahams Creek Road Crossing to flood isolating a number of rural properties upstream of this point. It is recommended that North Western Zone is contacted to discuss coordination of response including public messaging around this area.
- 2.) During a 0.2% AEP event, industrial sheds along Roseberry Road are inundated from Toolom Creek) and all properties north of Dalmorton Street are inundated in this event with depths up to 1.0 m (Subsector Woodenbong C).
- 3.) During a PMF event, properties north of Unumgar Street, west of Roseberry Street and the vicinity of Richmond Street *may* become inundated (Subsector Woodenbong B). The town still remains predominantly flood free with flow paths alongside the roads and crossing a small number of properties.

Muli Muli

- At Muli Muli, the town is not inundated by flooding until floods exceeding a 0.2% AEP event but may become isolated due to road closures along Clarence Way to the north and south during a 20% AEP event.
- During a PMF event, Muli Muli Crescent, the street closest to Tooloom Creek, is inundated (Subsector Muli Muli Crescent) but higher ground to the east is accessible until floodwaters have subsided (Subsector Muli Muli Hillside).

Urbenville

At Urbenville, flooding is dominated by riverine flooding from Tooloom Creek especially in larger events. There is overland flooding throughout the town in smaller events and in the northeast of the town in larger events between Beaury Street and Stephen Street.

- During a 20% AEP event, breakout flows from Toolom Creek downstream of Clarence Way Road Bridge may inundate some lots some lots south of Tooloom Street with depths of 200-300mm (Subsector Urbenville A).
- Clarence Way near the showground may also be overtopped with depths of 200mm over the road (Subsector Urbenville E).

	• The Urbenville Forest Park (Subsector Urbenville F) may become inundated if monitoring indicates Toolom Creek has overtopped upstream at Woodenbong.
	 During a 20% AEP event Tooloom and Boomi Creek expand to fill the floodplain. There are areas of Boomi Creek Road which are flooded frequently however the most significant area of flooding is the Boomi Creek Road crossing of Boomi Creek to the east of the Boomi Creek Road and Clarence Way Road intersection. At this location the road can be submerged for about 15 hours in the 20% AEP event and 20 hours in the 1% AEP event (Subsector Boomi Creek). This flooding is likely to cause localised road closures which may cause isolation of dwellings along Boomi Creek Road.
	 Models suggest flooding south of Urbenville in Tooloom Creek commences from a 20% AEP event, during which the floodplain starts to fill. Desktop assessment has not identified any dwellings within this extent however it is recommended that this is verified during future events (Subsector Urbenville South).
	 Clarence Way between Urbenville and Woodenbong Road is prone to flooding in various locations. In the 20% AEP event the road could be inundated for about 8 hours and in the 1% AEP event for about 15 hours (Subsector Urbenville North).
	• Flooding that occurs within the town is dominated by flows from the local catchments. The majority of flooding occurs in the natural flow path as water travels from the hill slopes west of the town. Minor flow paths form between Welch Street and Urben Street as overland flows downhill. When the overland flows join Tooloom Creek they overtop Tooloom Street with depths up to 400 mm (Subsector Urbenville A).
	2.) During a 5% AEP event, floodwaters will break out of the Tooloom Creek, with up to 1m depths on the floodplain south of Tooloom Street. There are flood water depths of up to 600 mm on the lots on the south side of Tooloom Street. Clarence Way road is overtopped with depths of 400 mm on the road. Tooloom Street is overtopped from tailwaters of Tooloom Creek with depths of 1m over the road (Subsectors Urbenville A and Urbenville B).
	3.) During a 1% AEP event, depths of up to 1.6m are predicted to occur on the lots on Tooloom Street. Floodwaters from Tooloom Creek cross Tooloom Street to properties on the north side of the street. There are predicted depths of up to 0.8m on Clarence Way and backwaters from the creek cause depths of 2.6m on Tooloom Street near the Old Saw Mill. The flooding from Tooloom Creek reaches the south end of Boomi Street. The flooding within the town is from overland flows besides the floodwaters south of Boomi Street (Subsectors Urbenville A and Urbenville B).
	 During a PMF event, the majority of the town is inundated except for high ground in the vicinity of Beaury Street and Crown Street (Subsector Urbenville C) and Deane Street (Subsector Urbenville F).
Sequencing of warnings and/ or	• Evacuation of vulnerable facilities such as the hospital, aged care facilities, schools, and child-care facilities will require a higher priority.
evacuations	 Note that liaison should be conducted with SES North Western Zone regarding any AWS products for the NSW SES Urbenville Unit's operational area of responsibility.
	• The NSW SES Urbenville unit's area of responsibility includes flood operations in Urbenville and Woodenbong, which crosses boundaries between the Kyogle and Tenterfield LGAs.
	 Communication should also be maintained between SES North Eastern Zone and SES North Western Zone if both are operational during flood events.

N 1	Voodenbong Sequencing
	 For Prediction 1: Watch and Act do not enter floodwater messaging for Subsector Woodenbong B (GEMS ID 59098) if monitoring indicates rising water levels in the vicinity of Richmond Street and Woodenbong Road.
	 Emergency Warning move to higher ground messaging for Woodenbong Campground and Woodenbong Showgrounds in Subsector Woodenbong B (GEMS ID 59098) if monitoring indicates Tooloom Creek is close to overtopping west of Woodenbong.
	 Watch and Act prepare to isolate messaging for properties along Linsday Creek Road in Subsectors Woodenbong A (GEMS ID 59097) and Lindsay Creek (GEMS ID 93360).
	 Watch and Act prepare to isolate messaging for properties along Clarence Way between Woodenbong and Muli Muli in Subsector Tooloom Creek (GEMS ID 93361).
	 Liaise with North Western Zone to discuss coordination of response including public messaging around the area upstream of the Grahams Creek Road Crossing.
	• For Prediction 2: Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for properties along Roseberry Road and north of Dalmorton Street in Subsector Woodenbong C (GEMS ID 59099) if monitoring indicates Tooloom Creek is overtopping west of Woodenbong.
	• For Prediction 3: Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for Subsector Woodenbong B (GEMS ID 59098) if monitoring confirms Tooloom Creek has overtopped, and ongoing heavy rainfall in predicted with the potential for a PMF event.
	• These actions should only be taken following active monitoring of conditions as prediction is based on known flood extents but not depths.
1	Auli Muli Sequencing
	• For Prediction 1: Watch and Act Messaging prepare to isolated messaging should be considered from a 20% AEP event, if heights are not expected to exceed a 0.2% AEP event.
	 For Prediction 2: Emergency Warning move to higher ground messaging for Subsector Mulu Muli Crescent (GEMS ID 59100) if Tooloom Creek has overtopped its banks at Woodenbong.
	• These actions should only be taken following active monitoring of conditions as prediction is based on known flood extents but not depths.
	Irbenville Sequencing
	• For Prediction 1: Watch and Act evacuation messaging for lots south of Tooloom Street in Subsector Urbenville A (GEMS ID 59094) if monitoring indicates that breakout flows are occurring along Tooloom Creek south of Clarence Way.
	 Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for campers in Urbenville Forest Park in Subsector Urbenville F (GEMS ID 85848) if monitoring of Tooloom Creek indicate it has overtopped upstream at Woodenbong.
	 Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for campers in Urbenville Showground in Subsector Urbenville E (GEMS ID 85848) if monitoring indicates Tooloom Creek may overtop the Clarence Way bridge isolating the Showgrounds.

	• Watch & Act Prepare to isolate for areas along Boomi Creek Road adjoining Boomi Creek, Subsector Boomi Creek (GEMS ID 93362). Localised road closures may occur from a 20% AEP event. Due to limited intelligence in this area, field monitoring and verification is recommended.
	 Watch & Act Do not drive into floodwater for Subsectors Urbenville South (GEMS ID 93364) and Urbenville North (GEMS ID 94634), if a 20% AEP event is predicted. Intelligence collection in the field is recommended to identify and confirm consequences.
	 For Prediction 2: Watch and Act do not enter floodwater messaging for Welch Street and Urben Street in Subsector Urbenville A (GEMS ID 59094) if monitoring indicated overland flows occurring from hill slopes west of town.
	 For Prediction 3: Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for Subsectors Urbenville A (GEMS ID 59094) and Urbenville B (GEMS ID 59691) if monitoring indicates Tooloom Creek is overtopping.
	 Emergency Warning evacuation messaging for houses in low lying areas adjoining Tooloom Creek south of Urbenville in Subsector Urbenville South (GEMS ID 93364)
	 These actions should only be taken following active monitoring of conditions as prediction is based on known flood extents but not depths.
Evacuation Routes	 Woodenbong Evacuation Route 1: Roseberry St - Dalmorton St- Lindsay St- Unumgar St.
	• Woodenbong Evacuation Route 2: Dalmorton St- Macpherson St - Unumgar St.
	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St.
	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St.
Evacuation Route	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes:
Evacuation Route Closure	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of Evacuation	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of Evacuation Evacuation	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas. Cross Road Church, 38 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of Evacuation Evacuation Centre/Assembly	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas. Cross Road Church, 38 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong. Woodenbong Hall, 21-23 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of Evacuation Evacuation Centre/Assembly Point	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas. Cross Road Church, 38 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong. Woodenbong Hall, 21-23 Unumgar Street, Urbenville. Within PMF flood extent.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of Evacuation Evacuation Centre/Assembly Point	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas. Cross Road Church, 38 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong. Woodenbong Hall, 21-23 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong. Urbenville Primary School, Welch Street, Urbenville. Within PMF flood extent. Urbenville Hall, Beaury St.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of Evacuation Evacuation Centre/Assembly Point Large scale evacuations	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas. Cross Road Church, 38 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong. Woodenbong Hall, 21-23 Unumgar Street, Urbenville. Within PMF flood extent. Urbenville Primary School, Welch Street, Urbenville. Within PMF flood extent. Urbenville Hall, Beaury St. When large-scale evacuations are likely, the NSW SES Incident Commander will liaise with the LEOCON and request support of the EOC as required. Large scale evacuations would be unlikely in this sector but if required additional locations will be identified.
Evacuation Route Closure Method of Evacuation Evacuation Centre/Assembly Point Large scale evacuations	 Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St- Stephen St - Welch St. Urbenville Evacuation Route 2: Clarence Way - Urben St - Beaury St. Road closures which may affect evacuation routes: Urbenville Evacuation Route 1: Tooloom St may be inundated from a 20% AEP event. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to higher ground. Primarily self-evacuation by private transport to evacuation centres/assembly areas. Cross Road Church, 38 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong. Woodenbong Hall, 21-23 Unumgar Street, Woodenbong. Urbenville Primary School, Welch Street, Urbenville. Within PMF flood extent. Urbenville Hall, Beaury St. When large-scale evacuations are likely, the NSW SES Incident Commander will liaise with the LEOCON and request support of the EOC as required. Large scale evacuations would be unlikely in this sector but if required additional locations will be identified. Additional locations may be identified in large scale evacuations, or if existing evacuation centres are flood affected or isolated.

Rescue Resupply	 The flood rescue management process adopted will be determined by the Incident Controller, based on the scale of the flood rescue operations. The Incident Controller may declare a flood rescue area of operations and establish a flood cell to assist with the management of flood rescues. Flood Rescue Operations will be undertaken as per the State Rescue Policy. Rescue hotspot: White Swamp Road over Woodenbong Creek, Old Koreelah. If resupply is required, it will be provided by the NSW SES through the 132500 call out system. Table 13, in Volume 2 provides information about isolated communities in the Kyogle Council area and potential periods of isolation.
Aircraft Management	 Helicopter Landing Points: There are no designated helicopter landing points in this sector. However, NSW SES has identified the following the possible location for a helicopter landing point. Ground truthing of this site is recommended prior to activation: ° Urbenville Public School S 28° 28' 25" E 152° 32' 43" Firm grass surface Slope North - South Football / soccer goal posts may be on field depending on season.
Other	 Special considerations relating to evacuation: Closure of schools - coordinated through the Department of Education and Training. The evacuation of domestic animals, horses and livestock to the appropriate facility to be managed by Department of Primary Industries and Local Land Services. Closure of licensed premises. All hotels and licensed clubs will be closed if required. Security. Police patrols to be established to maintain law and order after evacuation has occurred. The NSW SES will use flood boats, aircraft, community contacts and other agencies to monitor the safety of individuals, where feasible. These arrangements will stay in place until the "Return with Caution" is provided by the NSW SES to residents to return to their premises.

3.2. WOODENBONG COMMUNITY MAP

3.3. URBENVILLE COMMUNITY MAP

July 2024

3.4. WOODENBONG EVACUATION PLANNING

3.5. URBENVILLE EVACUATION PLANNING

July 2024

KYOGLE NSW SES DAM FAILURE ARRANGEMENTS

Chapter 3 of Volume 3 (NSW SES Response Arrangements for Kyogle) of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan

Last Update: July 2024

AUTHORISATION

NSW SES Dam Failure Arrangements in has been prepared by the NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES) as part of a comprehensive planning process. The information contained herein has been compiled from the latest available technical studies and Dam Safety Emergency Plan.

Approved

En_

NSW SES North Eastern Zone Acting Coordinator Planning (Elena Palamara)

Date: 02/07/2024

Approved

NSW SES North Eastern Acting Deputy Zone Commander (Telesia Loloa)

Date:

Tabled at LEMC

02/07/2024

Date:

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1 DETAILS OF THE DAM FAILURE WARNING SYSTEM FOR TOONUMBAR DAM

This Section describes the downstream consequences and specific notification and warning arrangements for the failure of Toonumbar Dam and should be read in conjunction with the response arrangements detailed in the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan, Volume 1 of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Plan.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 Toonumbar Dam is a 44 m high earth and rockfill embankment constructed to store water for the benefit of riparian users and the future development of irrigation by private pumping from the stream. Its spillway is an ungated concrete lined spillway chute with flip bucket.

Toonumbar Dam is located on Iron Pot Creek, 20km west of Kyogle, in the Richmond River Basin.

- 1.1.2 The two most likely causes of dam failure are:
 - a. Failure due to flood levels overtopping the embankment.
 - b. Failure due to rapidly deteriorating structural deficiency such as may be induced by an extreme earthquake, internal erosion, piping, landslide or sabotage. (This is the so-called "Sunny Day" failure, ie not induced by an inflow flood).
- 1.1.3 Although the dam is currently in good condition, an unsafe or emergency condition could occur at any time due to extreme natural events. Failure from a cause not related to extreme natural events is always a possibility although the probability of occurrence is extremely low.

1.2 CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE

- 1.2.1 Dam failure could result in the following:
 - a. Inundation of property in downstream areas including Ettrick, Doubtful Creek, Dobies Bight, Casino, Ghinni Ghi.
- 1.2.2 Approximately 145 people are at risk of inundation by failure of Toonumbar Dam (Table 1).

Modelled Event	Population at Risk
Sunny Day Failure	8 (day)
	16 (night)
PMF Failure	100 (day)
	145 (night)

 Table 1: Number of houses and population at risk of inundation

- 1.2.3 The number of people at risk of inundation in the two modelled scenarios is shown in the table above. The study area of the model extends from the dam downstream to Ettrick, Doubtful Creek, Dobies Bight, Casino and Ghinni Ghi.
- 1.2.4 The DSEP identifies population at risk. In the event of an Alert being issued to SES for Toonumbar Dam, some or all of this population may require evacuation.

1.3 FLOW TRAVEL TIMES

Non-Flood ('Sunny Day') Dam Failure

1.3.1 Flood wave arrival and peak times have been calculated for locations downstream of Toonumbar Dam for a non-flood 'Sunny Day' Failure only in the Toonumbar Dam DSEP (Table 2).

Table 2: Approximate nood wave travel times from Toonumbar Dam. Sunny Day, Tallur	Table	2: Approximate	flood wave t	travel times	from Toonum	bar Dam 'S	unny Day' fai	ilure
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Location	Start of Dam-break Flood Wave (hh:mm)	Peak of Dam-break Flood Wave (hh:mm)
Confluence of Iron Pot Creek and Eden Creek	1h45min	3h15min
Waldrons Bridge	4h30min	6h
Confluence of Eden Creek and Richmond River	6h15min	7h45min

Note: The travel time relates to only one component of the lead-up time before downstream flooding commences, and therefore of the possible warning time. Source: Modelling based on Toonumbar Dam PRA 2013 (DOC14/15146)

Probable Maximum Flood Failure Scenario:

- 1.3.2 It should be noted that dambreak resulting from extreme rainfall would be preceded by flooding many times more destructive than from a flood equivalent to the flood of record.
- 1.3.3 It should be noted that the travel times listed relate to only one component of the lead-up time before downstream flooding commences, and should be considered indicative only.

1.4 INUNDATION AREA

1.4.1 Downstream flood inundation could occur as the result of a dam failure due to a 'Flood' or a 'Sunny Day' failure.

Flood Failure

- 1.4.2 The credible failure modes that are the main contributors at Toonumbar Dam include: overtopping erosion of the main embankment and subsidiary embankment and internal erosion of the main embankment and subsidiary embankment.
- 1.4.3 Theoretical dam failure is when storage has reached Dam Crest Level (RL 139.075m AHD).

Sunny Day Failure

- 1.4.4 In the unlikely event of the dam failing under normal inflow conditions, downstream flood inundation would result from water held in the storage.
- 1.4.5 Potential failure may occur due to a rapidly deteriorating structural deficiency such as may be induced by an extreme earthquake, internal erosion or overtopping erosion.
- 1.4.6 The non-flood failure is considered to have the most potential for loss of life as it is likely to occur when there are no flood warnings and hence emergency services are not on standby and the public is unprepared.

1.5 INUNDATION MAPPING

1.5.1 Dambreak flood inundation mapping has been prepared for Toonumbar Dam and is contained in the Toonumbar Dam Safety Emergency Plan.

1.6 MONITORING

- 1.6.1 The dam owner/operator is responsible for monitoring and managing any potential emergency at the dam site.
- 1.6.2 The monitoring systems are Hydraulic Piezometers, Seepage Points, Cross Arms, Pin Pairs, and Reservoir Level Gauge.

1.7 NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

1.7.1 The primary contact for dam failure warning notification by the dam owner to the NSW SES is the NSW SES 24hr Operations Centre. The NSW SES Operations Centre will subsequently notify the NSW SES North-Eastern Zone Incident Controller or After-Hours Duty Officer. An alternate NSW State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) contact is available if this notification procedure was to fail.

1.8 WARNING

- 1.8.1 Dam failure alerts are issued to NSW SES and are used to trigger appropriate response actions. Alerts from the DSEP for flood failure have been reproduced in Table 4 against NSW SES responses. Responses escalate as the alert migrates from white to red. The conditions that define each of the alerts (as identified in the DSEP) are listed in Table 3. The meaning of each alert is as follows:
 - a. White: Preliminary alert to assist the NSW SES in its preparation. This is not a public alert. It indicates a potential issue/condition has been observed at the dam and is being investigated.
 - b. **Amber:** Alert necessitating the warning of the population at risk to prepare for evacuation.
 - c. **Red:** Alert requiring the immediate evacuation of the downstream population at risk.
- 1.8.2 Actions indicated as occurring at particular alerts may be brought forward if the development of a flood warrants.

Alert	Defining Conditions
White Alert	Storage is expected to reach or has reached FSL + 2.47m (RL 132.1m AHD)
Amber Alert	Storage is expected to reach or has reached FSL +5.37m (RL 135.00m AHD)
Red Alert	Storage is expected to reach or has reached Dam Crest Level (RL 139.075m AHD)

Table 3: Toonumbar Dam flood failure alerts

- 1.8.3 The NSW SES/ Water NSW will disseminate dam failure warnings.
- 1.8.4 Water NSW Staff will keep the NSW SES informed of the discharge through the spillway. The dam alerts will be activated in sequence as the storage level rises during the course of a major flood event and will be sent to the NSW SES as they occur.
- 1.8.5 The following tables outline the notification, warning and evacuation arrangements for a potential failure of Toonumbar Dam.

Table 4: Notification, warning and evacuation arrangements for a potential failure ofToonumbar Dam

		WHITE ALERT		
Defining	g Conditio	ons:		
•	When the (RL132.1r	e storage is expected to reach or has reached FSL + 2.47m mAHD).		
•	Any new dam, abu	measurable seepage point on the main embankment, subsidiary itments or spillway interface.		
•	New mea wall joint	isurable seepage from spillway subsurface drain(s) or spillway slab and is(s).		
•	Turbid se	epage water at established seepage points.		
•	Unexpect	ted seepage within the outlet tunnel.		
•	• Earth tremor assessed as MMI 5 or greater intensity.			
٠	• Unexpected change or suspected movement observed in dam structure(s).			
•	• Unexpected change in piezometer pressure(s).			
Unexpected change observed in spillway.				
Rupture of the outlet works.				
Stakeh	older	Arrangements and Actions		
Dam Ov	wner	Advise NSW SES Operations Communications Centre of White Alert Level being reached and provide regular updates on the situation at the dam.		
NSW SE	S SOC	Receive notification from dam operator.		
		 Advise NSW SES Zone Incident Controller or After Hours Duty Officer. 		
		Advise SEOC.		
NSW SE	S Zone	Receive notification from NSW SES SHQ.		
Incident	t	Advise NSW SES Local Controller and/o unit Commander or		
Control	Centre	Duty Officer, NSW SES Units and NSW SES Local Headquarters.		
or After Duty Of	r Hours fficer	 Advise the Regional Emergency Management Officer (REMO). 		
		 Consider need for out of area assistance for warning and evacuation operations. 		
		 Refer to Kyogle Council Flood Emergency Sub Plan for agencies to notify that the White Alert Level has been reached. (See Volume 1). 		

NSW SES Local Commander and/or Kyogle Unit Commander or After Hours Duty Officer	 Confirm NSW SES Zone HQ has been notified. Activate Flood Emergency Sub Plan. Refer to Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan for agencies to notify that the White Alert Level has been reached. (See Volume 1).
LEOCON/Other Agencies	 When requested by NSW SES Incident Controller, coordinate support. Activation of the Kyogle Council Flood Emergency Sub Plan includes notification to the LEOCON and activation of supporting arrangements within the local EMPLAN.
People at Risk	 No action required. Some evacuations may be necessary due to mainstream riverine flooding.

AMBER ALERT		_		
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Defining Conditions:

- When the storage is expected to reach or has reached FSL + 5.37m (RL135.0mAHD).
- Unexpected increased seepage and/or turbidity at established seepage points.
- Vortex forming in storage.
- Longitudinal or transverse cracking in the embankment(s).
- Cracking at the interface of the embankment and training wall.
- Sliding or settlement of the embankment(s).
- Instability of the abutments.

Stakeholder	Arrangements and Actions
Dam Owner	 Advise NSW SES Operations Communications Centre of Amber Alert Level being reached and provide regular updates on the situation at the dam.
	 Closely monitor the condition of Toonumbar Dam and implement preventative measures to return it to a safe condition as soon as possible.
NSW SES SOC	 Receive notification from dam operator. Advise NSW SES Zone Incident Controller or After Hours Duty Officer. Advise SEOC.

NSW SES Incident Control Centre or After Hours Duty Officer	 Notify NSW SES Local Commander and/or Unit Commander or Duty Officer, NSW SES units and NSW SES LHQ. Provide NSW SES AWS warnings to the media
	Flood Emergency Sub Plan.
	 Coordinate provision of out of area assistance for warning and evacuation operations.
	 Coordinate the notification of other agencies as listed in Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan.
NSW SES Local	Confirm NSW SES Zone HQ has been notified.
and/or Kyogle	 Coordinate the delivery of Evacuation Warnings (Watch and Act) to at-risk residents.
Commander or After Hours Duty Officer	 Coordinate the notification of other agencies as listed in Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan.
LEOCON/Other Agencies	 When requested by the NSW SES Incident Controller, coordinate support.
	 Activation of Kyogle Council Flood Emergency Sub Plan includes notification to the LEOCON and activation of supporting arrangements within the local EMPLAN.
People at Risk	 Prepare homes for inundation, pack valuables, mementos and pets and prepare to evacuate.
	 Notify NSW SES doorknockers if transport to evacuation centres will be required.
	 Some evacuations may be necessary due to mainstream riverine flooding.

RED ALERT

Defining Conditions:

- When the storage is expected to reach or has reached Dam Crest Level (RL139.075m AHD).
- Major movement of the embankment and/or spillway training wall that will likely lead to instability.
- Major cracking of the embankment(s) that will likely lead to piping failure.
- Major slope instability of the embankment(s).

Stakeholder	Arrangements and Actions
Dam Owner	 Advise NSW SES Operations Communications Centre of Red Alert Level being reached and provide regular updates on the situation at the dam.
SES SOC	 Receive notification from dam operator. Advise NSW Zone Incident Controller or After Hours Duty Officer. Advise SEOC.
NSW SES Zone Incident Control Centre or After Hours Duty Officer	 Notify NSW SES Local Commander and Unit Commander or Duty Officer, NSW SES Units and NSW SES LHQ. Advise the REMO. Confirm that residents immediately downstream of the dam have been notified of Red Alert Level being reached. Activate the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) and ensure that Evacuation Orders are broadcast over the radio stations listed in Volume 3: Chapter 1 of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan. Coordinate provision of out of area assistance for evacuation operations.
NSW SES Local Commander and/or Kyogle Unit Commander or After Hours Duty Officer	 Confirm NSW SES Zone HQ has been notified. Evacuate at-risk residents. Coordinate the notification of other agencies as per the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan. Ensure that evacuation centres are ready to receive evacuees. Conduct evacuation of downstream residents by doorknock and public address systems from emergency service vehicles. Coordinate transport of evacuees without their own vehicles.
LEOCON/Other Agencies People at Risk	 When requested by the NSW SES Incident Controller, coordinate support. Activation of the Kyogle Council Flood Emergency Sub Plan includes notification to the LEOCON and activation of supporting arrangements within the local EMPLAN. Evacuate to nearest evacuation centre or assembly area
reopie at hisk	

DAM FAILURE ALERT CANCELLATION		
Defining Conditio	Dam owner assesses threat and advises whether the risk to the dam structure has passed.	
Stakeholder	Arrangements and Actions	
Dam Owner	 Advise NSW SES OCC of the outcome of the risk assessment. 	
SES SOC	 Receive notification from dam operator. Advise NSW SES Zone Commander or After Hours Duty Officer. Advise SEOC. 	
NSW SES Zone Incident Control Centre or After Hours Duty Officer	 Following risk assessment of the dam, decide in consultation with NSW SES Incident Controller and State Duty Commander whether to issue a 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution'. Issue 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' message to NSW SES Unit Commander or Duty Officer, NSW SES units, NSW SES Local HQ and NSW SES State HQ. Advise the REMO/LEMO that 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' has been issued. Issue 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' message over radio stations listed in Volume 3: Chapter 1, of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan. 	
NSW SES Local Commander and/or Kyogle Unit Commander or After Hours Duty Officer	 Coordinate issue of 'All Clear' message at evacuation centres or by phone/doorknock. Deliver 'All Clear' message to other agencies as necessary. 	
LEOCON/Other Agencies	When requested by the NSW SES Incident Controller, coordinate support.	
People at Risk	• Stay home, return home or await further advice.	

1.9 EVACUATION PLANNING

- 1.9.1 **Sunny Day Failure:** Upon consultation on dam condition with Water NSW an Amber alert for Toonumbar Dam may require a Watch and Act Prepare to evacuate for properties within Sunny Day dambreak extent. There is approximately 1hr 45 mins from start of dambreak flood wave reaches confluence of Iron Pot Creek and Edens Creek.
- 1.9.2 Upon receipt of a Red alert for Toonumbar Dam; Emergency Warning (Move to Higher Ground) for properties within the dambreak extent should be considered.
- 1.9.3 The main dam access road is likely to be closed and it is highly likely that road closures will occur along Iron Pot Creek, affecting evacuation from the immediate areas downstream of the dam.
- 1.9.4 **PMF Flood with Dambreak:** Whilst flood wave travel time is not available for a PMF Flood with Dambreak in the current DEP, it may be assumed that many properties within the extent would be affected by flood conditions prior to dambreak occurring.
- 1.9.5 Relevant warning and evacuation messaging should be applied to properties within the dam inundation extent upon receipt of a White, Amber or Red alert from Water NSW.

2 DETAILS OF THE DAM FAILURE WARNING SYSTEM FOR BONALBO (PETROCHILOS) DAM

This Section describes the downstream consequences and specific notification and warning arrangements for the failure of Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam and should be read in conjunction with the response arrangements detailed in the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan, Volume 1 of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.1.1 Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam is an off-creek water storage for Bonalbo. Water is pumped from bores in Peacock Creek to Bonalbo Dam from where it is pumped via a chlorinator house to a concrete reservoir for distribution. It is a homogeneous earthfill embankment dam. The main embankment has a maximum height of 13.3m, a crest length of 140m and a crest width of 6m. There is an internal drainage system comprised of a partial blanket filter and a rock toe drain.

The Dam consists of a drop inlet and an emergency by-wash spillway on the right abutment. The reservoir has a storage capacity at FSL (RL 98.3m or 194.15m AHD) is 55ML and the catchment area is 16ha.

The dam is in Bonalbo, which is located on the Clarence Way approximately 24 kilometres north of the Bruxner Highway. The dam is located on the outskirts of Bonalbo approximately 0.5 kilometres north- west of the town. It lies within the Kyogle LGA and Clarence River Basin.

- 2.1.2 The two most likely causes of dam failure are:
 - a. Failure due to flood levels overtopping the embankment.
 - b. Failure due to rapidly deteriorating structural deficiency such as may be induced by an extreme earthquake, internal erosion, piping, landslide or sabotage. (This is the so-called 'Sunny Day' failure, ie not induced by an inflow flood).
- 2.1.3 Although the dam is currently in good condition, an unsafe or emergency condition could occur at any time due to extreme natural events. Failure from a cause not related to extreme natural events is always a possibility although the probability of occurrence is extremely low.
- 2.1.4 The Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam is estimated to be able to withstand a flood volume up to the Probable Maximum Flood passing through the storage.

2.2 CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE

- 2.2.1 Dam failure could result in the following:
 - a. Inundation of property in downstream areas including low-lying areas of Bonalbo during a Sunny Day Failure, with wider inundation during a PMF

and PMF Dambreak including inundation of the road bridge over Peacock Creek.

- 2.2.2 Approximately 128 dwellings could be inundated by failure of Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam.
- 2.2.3 The Sunny Day Dambreak flood would pass through the downstream area of Bonalbo with some damages and losses. The flood would inundate 31 houses in the town in the flat low-lying floodplain on the banks of the creek downstream of the dam. The streets are inundated by about 0.3m to 1.0m and the flood velocity is estimated at 1.3m/s to 2.8m/s. The bridge across Peacock Creek was not affected by the sunny Day Dambreak flood.
- 2.2.4 The PMF and PMF Dambreak cases have similar flooding conditions as the town is submerged to a high degree. The PMF case inundated 46 houses and the PMF Dambreak case inundated 51 houses in the town along the stretch of the creek downstream of the dam. The streets are inundated by about 0.8 m to 1.6m and the flood velocity was estimated at 1.3m/s to 3.3m/s. The bridge across Peacock Creek is flooded by both the PMF flood and PMF Dambreak flood by about 2.4m but the flood velocity is quite low.

Modelled Event	Number of Houses	Population at Risk
Sunny Day Failure	31	84
PMF	46	124
PMF Dambreak	51	138

- 2.2.5 The number of houses at risk of inundation in three modelled scenarios is shown in the table above. The study area of the model extends from the dam downstream to the Peacock Creek bridge.
- 2.2.6 The DSEP identifies properties at risk. In the event of an Alert being issued to SES for Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam, some or all of these properties may require evacuation.

2.3 FLOW TRAVEL TIMES

2.3.1 Dambreak flood wave travel time to various key residential locations is identified in the table below;

Location	Travel time in a PMF (h:mm)	Travel time in a PMF with Dambreak (h:mm)	Travel time in a Sunny Day failure (h:mm)
Locations along	0:40 to 1:10	0:05 to 1:10	0:05 to 0:10
Woodenbong Road			
Locations along	0:45 to 1:30	0:50 to 1:30	0:05 to 0:15
Bonalbo St			
Locations along	1:20 to 4:00	1:20 to 4:00	0:10 to 0:40
Peacock St			
Locations along	0:25 to 4:00	0:30 to 4:00	0:10 to 1:15
Sandilands St			
Locations along	3:00	0:20 to 3:00	0:35
Capeen St			

Table 6: Dambreak flood wave travel time

- 2.3.2 It should be noted that the travel times listed relate to only one component of the lead-up time before downstream flooding commences, and should be considered indicative only.
- 2.3.3 For further information is contained in the Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam DSEP.

2.4 INUNDATION AREA

2.4.1 Downstream flood inundation could occur as the result of a dam failure due to a 'Flood' or a 'Sunny Day' failure.

Flood Failure

- 2.4.2 Degree of flooding at Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam is defined as the height of water flowing through the spillway structure. This parameter is measured by electronic equipment.
- 2.4.3 The theoretical failure level is 196.00m AHD when the dam crest level is reached.

Sunny Day Failure

- 2.4.4 In the unlikely event of the dam failing under normal inflow conditions, downstream flood inundation would result from water held in the storage.
- 2.4.5 There are certain circumstances and behaviour traits for embankment dams that may be indicative of the development of a potential emergency situation which might ultimately lead to dam failure. These can include signs of movement, impact damage, leakage and changes in instrument readings.
- 2.4.6 The non-flood failure is considered to have the most potential for loss of life as it is likely to occur when there are no flood warnings and hence emergency services are not on standby and the public is unprepared.

2.5 INUNDATION MAPPING

2.5.1 Dambreak flood inundation mapping has been prepared for Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam and is contained in the Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam Safety Emergency Plan.

2.6 MONITORING

- 2.6.1 The dam owner/operator is responsible for monitoring and managing any potential emergency at the dam site.
- 2.6.2 Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam is monitored by a network of instrumentation comprising: Storage Level Manual Indicators, Storage Level Automatic Level, Standpipe, Piezometers, Seepage pipe outlet V- notch weir, Rain gauge. There are also routine visual inspections.

2.7 NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

2.7.1 The primary contact for dam failure warning notification by the dam owner to the NSW SES is the NSW SES 24hr Operations Centre. The NSW SES Operations Centre will subsequently notify the NSW SES North-Eastern Zone Incident Controller or After-Hours Duty Officer. An alternate NSW State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) contact is available if this notification procedure was to fail.

2.8 WARNING

- 2.8.1 Dam failure alerts are issued to NSW SES and are used to trigger appropriate response actions. Alerts from the DSEP for flood failure have been reproduced in Table 4 against NSW SES responses. Responses escalate as the alert migrates from white to red. The conditions that define each of the alerts (as identified in the DSEP) are listed in Table 8. The meaning of each alert is as follows:
 - a. White: Preliminary alert to assist the NSW SES in its preparation. This is not a public alert. It indicates a potential issue/condition has been observed at the dam and is being investigated.
 - b. **Amber:** Alert necessitating the warning of the population at risk to prepare for evacuation.
 - c. **Red:** Alert requiring the immediate evacuation of the downstream population at risk.
- 2.8.2 Actions indicated as occurring at particular alerts may be brought forward if the development of a flood warrants.
| Alert | Defining Conditions | Indicative Time to Reach Alert
(approx) |
|-------------|------------------------|--|
| White Alert | L98.6m or 194.40m AHD | 6 mins from FSL |
| Amber Alert | Nil Defined | - |
| Red Alert | RL99.8m or 195.60m AHD | 18 mins from White Alert |

Table 7: Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam flood failure alerts

- 2.8.3 The NSW SES will disseminate dam failure warnings.
- 2.8.4 Kyogle Council Staff will keep the NSW SES informed of the discharge through the spillway. The dam alerts will be activated in sequence as the storage level rises during the course of a major flood event and will be sent to the NSW SES as they occur.
- 2.8.5 The following tables outline the notification, warning and evacuation arrangements for a potential failure of Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam.

Table 8: Notification, warming and evacuation arrangements for a potential failure of Bonalbo(Petrochilos) Dam

WHITE ALERT						
Defining Conditio	Ins: Emergency flooding condition should be reported when the storage reaches RL98.6m or 194.40m AHD.					
Stakeholder	Arrangements and Actions					
Dam Owner	 Advise NSW SES Operations Communications Centre of White Alert Level being reached and provide regular updates on the situation at the dam. 					
SES SOC	 Receive notification from dam operator. Advise NSW SES Zone Incident Controller of After Hours Duty Officer. Advise SEOC 					
NSW SES Zone	Receive notification from NSW SES SHQ.					
Incident Control Centre or After Hours	 Advise NSW SES Local Controller or Duty Officer, NSW SES Units and NSW SES Local Headquarters. 					
Duty Officer	 Advise the Regional Emergency Management Officer (REMO). 					
	 Consider need for out of area assistance for warning and evacuation operations. 					
	 Refer to Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan for agencies to notify that the White Alert Level has been reached (See Volume 1). 					
NSW SES Local	Confirm NSW SES Zone HQ has been notified.					
Commander and/or Kyogle	Activate Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan.					
City Unit Commander or After Hours Duty Officer	 Refer to Flood Emergency Sub Plan for agencies to notify that the White Alert Level has been reached. (See Volume 1). 					
LEOCON/Other Agencies	 When requested by NSW SES Local Incident Controller, coordinate support. 					
	 Activation of Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan includes notification to the LEOCON and activation of supporting arrangements within the local EMPLAN. 					
People at Risk	No action required.					
	 Some evacuations may be necessary due to mainstream riverine flooding. 					

RED ALERT						
Defining Conditio	Depth over spillway 1.85m					
Stakeholder	Arrangements and Actions					
Dam Owner	 Advise NSW SES Operations Communications Centre of Red Alert Level being reached and provide regular updates on the situation at the dam. 					
SES SOC	Receive notification from dam operator.					
	 Advise NSW SES Zone Incident Control Centre or After Hours Duty Officer. 					
	Advise SEOC.					
NSW SES Zone Incident	 Notify NSW SES Local Commander and Unit Commander or Duty Officer, NSW SES Units and NSW SES LHQ. 					
Control Centre	Advise the REMO.					
or After Hours	 Confirm that residents immediately downstream of the dam have been notified of Red Alert Level being reached. 					
Duty Officer	 Activate the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) and ensure that Emergency Warning Evacuation Messaging is broadcast over the radio stations listed in Vol 3: Chapter 1 of this Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan. 					
	 Coordinate provision of out of area assistance for evacuation operations. 					
NSW SES Local	• Confirm NSW SES Zone HQ has been notified.					
Commander	Evacuate at-risk residents.					
and/or Kyogle Unit	 Coordinate the notification of other agencies as per the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan. 					
Commander or After Hours	 Ensure that evacuation centres are ready to receive evacuees. 					
Duty Officer	 Conduct Evacuation of downstream residents by doorknock and public address systems from emergency service vehicles. 					
	 Coordinate transport of evacuees without their own vehicles. 					
LEOCON/Other Agencies	When requested by the NSW SES Incident Controller, coordinate support.					
	 Activation of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan includes notification to the LEOCON and activation of supporting arrangements within the local EMPLAN. 					
People at Risk	• Evacuate to nearest evacuation centre or assembly area.					

DAM FAILURE ALERT CANCELLATION						
Defining Conditio	ns: Dam owner assesses threat and advises whether the risk to the dam structure has passed.					
Stakeholder	Arrangements and Actions					
Dam Owner	 Advise NSW SES SOC of the outcome of the risk assessment. 					
SES SOC	 Receive notification from dam operator. Advise NSW SES Zone Commander or After Hours Duty Officer. Advise SEOC. 					
NSW SES Zone Commander or Incident	 Following risk assessment of the dam, decide in consultation with NSW SES Incident Controller and State Duty Commander whether to issue an 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution'. 					
Controller or After Hours Duty Officer	 Issue 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' message to NSW SES Unit Commander or Duty Officer, NSW SES units, NSW SES Local HQ and NSW SES State HQ. 					
	 Advise the REMO/LEMO that 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' has been issued. 					
	 Issue 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' message over radio stations listed in Volume 3: Chapter 1, of this Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan. 					
NSW SES Local Commander And/or Kyogle	 Coordinate issue of 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' message at evacuation centres or by phone/doorknock. 					
Unit Commander or	 Deliver 'Reduced Threat – Return with Caution' message to other agencies as necessary. 					
After Hours Duty Officer						
LEOCON/Other Agencies	When requested by the NSW SES Local Incident Controller, coordinate support.					
People at Risk	• Stay home, return home or await further advice.					

2.9 EVACUATION PLANNING

- 2.9.1 **Sunny Day Failure:** There are 31 properties identified as being at is risk during a Sunny Day Failure in Bonalbo township.
- 2.9.2 Due to the short-wave travel time, evacuation outside the dambreak extent would be via Woodebong Road, Sandilands Road and Capeen Street to high ground along Oak Street.
- 2.9.3 Mapping of affected properties is held within the Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam Safety Emergency Plan.
- 2.9.4 **PMF without Dambreak:** There are 46 properties identified as being at risk during a PMF event without dambreak.
- 2.9.5 Mapping of affected properties is held within the Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam Safety Emergency Plan.
- 2.9.6 **PMF Flood with Dambreak:** There are an additional 5 properties identified as being at risk during a PMF event with dambreak. Therefore, it cannot be assumed all affected properties would have been evacuated due to the flood event without dambreak.
- 2.9.7 Mapping of affected properties is held within the Bonalbo (Petrochilos) Dam Safety Emergency Plan.

Table 9: Approximate evacuation and warning timelines for number of inundated dwellings in modelled scenarios

Modelled Event	Number of	Warning Time (hrs)	Evacuation Time	
	Dwellings		(hrs)	
Sunny Day Failure	31	1.1	3.1	
PMF without Dam	46	1.13	3.14	
Break				
PMF with Dam	51	1.15	3.2	
Break				



KYOGLE NSW SES

CARAVAN PARK ARRANGEMENTS

Chapter 4 of Volume 3 (NSW SES Response Arrangements for Kyogle) of the Kyogle Flood Emergency Sub Plan)

Last Update: July 2024



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1 ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EVACUATION OF CARAVAN PARKS AND THE RELOCATION OF MOVABLE DWELLINGS

1.1 GENERAL

- 1.1.1 The following caravan parks and camping grounds are flood liable:
 - a. Kyogle Gardens Caravan Park
 - b. Kyogle Showgrounds
 - c. Iron Pot Creek Campground
 - d. Peacock Creek Campground
 - e. Bonalbo Carvan Park
 - f. Tooloom Falls Campground
 - g. Woodenbong Campground
 - h. Urbenville Showgrounds
 - i. Urbenville Forest Park
 - j. Tabulam Racecourse Campground
- 1.1.2 For more information on individual caravan parks see Table 1 at the end of this Chapter.

1.2 ADVISING PROCEDURES

- 1.2.1 Caravan Park proprietors will ensure that the owners and occupiers of movable dwellings are:
 - a. Made aware that the caravan park is flood liable by:
 - Providing a written notice to occupiers taking up residence. The notice will indicate that the caravan park is liable to flooding and designate the location of flood liable land within the park (1).
 - Displaying this notice and the emergency arrangements for the Caravan Park prominently in the park.
 - b. Made aware that if they are expecting to be absent for extended periods, they should:
 - Provide the manager of the caravan park with a contact address and telephone number in case of an emergency.
 - Leave any movable dwelling in a condition allowing it to be relocated in an emergency (i.e. should ensure that the wheels, axles and draw bar of the caravans are not removed, and are maintained in proper working order).

- c. Informed of Flood Warning Information. At this time, occupiers will be advised to:
 - Ensure that they have spare batteries for their radios.
 - Listen to a local radio station for updated flood information.
 - Prepare for evacuation and movable dwelling relocation.
- 1.2.2 The NSW SES Richmond Valley Local Commander will ensure that the managers of caravan parks are advised of Flood Information (described in Volume 1 of the Kyogle Council Flood Emergency Sub Plan).

1.3 EVACUATION OF OCCUPANTS AND RELOCATION OF MOVEABLE

DWELLINGS

- 1.3.1 When an evacuation order is given caravan park occupants should follow the flood evacuation procedures for the park under the direction of the caravan park management. This should include advice to:
 - a. Isolate power to moveable dwellings.
 - b. Collect personal papers, medicines, a change of clothing, toiletries and bedclothes.
 - c. Lift the other contents in any remaining dwellings as high as possible.
 - d. Move to friends, relatives or a designated evacuation centre if they have their own transport, or move to the caravan office to await transport.
 - e. If undertaking self-managed evacuation, register their movements with the caravan park management upon leaving the park.
- 1.3.2 Where possible, movable dwellings that can be moved will be relocated by their owners. Park managers will arrange for the relocation of movable dwellings as required. Council and NSW SES personnel may assist if required. Vans are to be moved to the locations outlined in Table 1 at the end of this Chapter.
- 1.3.3 Caravan park managers will:
 - a. Secure any movable dwellings that are not able to be relocated to prevent floatation.
 - b. Ensure that their caravan park is capable of being evacuated in a timely and safe manner.
 - c. Advise the NSW SES Richmond Valley Local Commander of:
 - The number of people requiring transport.
 - Details of any medical evacuations required.
 - Whether additional assistance is required to effect the evacuation.
 - d. Check that all residents and visitors are accounted for.

- e. Inform the NSW SES Richmond Valley Local Commander when the evacuation of the caravan park has been completed.
- f. Provide the NSW SES Richmond Valley Local Commander with a register of people that have been evacuated.

1.4 RETURN OF OCCUPANTS AND MOVEABLE DWELLINGS

- 1.4.1 The NSW SES Richmond Valley Local Commander, using council resources as necessary, will advise when it is safe for the caravan parks to be re-occupied.
- 1.4.2 Moveable dwellings will be returned back to the caravan park(s) by owners or by vehicles and drivers arranged by the park managers.
- 1.4.3 Council and NSW SES personnel may assist by request where resources are available.

Name	Address/Location description	Town/Sector	Number of sites	Risk	Evacuation route	Evacuation route closure	Moveable dwelling relocation location	Evacuation centre	Notes
Kyogle Gardens Caravan Park	34 Summerland Way	Kyogle, Kyogle Sector	15 campsites, 5 mobile cabins	Inundation commences by 14m at Kyogle gauge.	Summerland Way – Kyogle Memorial Hall	Intersection of Summerland Way at Kyogle Road, 13.5m at Kyogle Gauge.	Geneva St carpark	Kyogle Memorial Hall	Low Flood Island
Kyogle Showgrounds	43 Summerland Way	Kyogle, Kyogle Sector	20 campsites	Inundation by 14m at Kyogle gauge.	Summerland Way – Kyogle Memorial Hall	Intersection of Summerland Way at Kyogle Road, 13.5m at Kyogle Gauge.	Geneva St carpark	Kyogle Memorial Hall	Low Flood Island
Iron Pot Creek Campground	Murray Scrub Road	Toonumbar National Park, Kyogle Sector	10 campsites	Risk of isolation	NA	NA	NA	NA	High Flood Island
Peacock Creek Campground	Peacock Creek Road	Peacock Creek, Bonalbo Sector	7 campsites	Risk of isolation	NA	NA	Higher ground to east along Peacock Creek Road	NA	Rising Road Access
Bonalbo Carvan Park	1-7 Woodenbong Road, Bonalbo	Bonalbo, Bonalbo Sector	10 unpowered campsites, 6 powered sites	Risk of inundation from Peacock Creek	Woodenbong Road – Yabbra St	Woodenbong Road near Bonalbo Recreation Club	High ground near hospital	Bonalbo Central School	Rising Road Access
Tooloom Falls Campground	Bandahngan Loop	Bandahngan Aboriginal Area, Urbenville Sector	5 sites	Risk of isolation and potential inundation	NA	NA	High ground north of Tooloom Falls	NA	Rising Road Access

Table 1: Caravan parks and campgrounds at risk of inundation and/or isolation from flooding.

Name	Address/Location description	Town/Sector	Number of sites	Risk	Evacuation route	Evacuation route closure	Moveable dwelling relocation location	Evacuation centre	Notes
Woodenbong Campground	Unumgar St	Woodenbong, Urbenville Sector	25 van sites, 20 tent sites	Inundation	Mount Lindesay Road near entrance	Mount Lindsay Road	Woodenbong Hall	Woodenbong Hall	Low Flood Island
Urbenville Showgrounds	Clarence Way	Urbenville, Urbenville Sector	10 powered sites, 100p capacity	Inundation	Clarence Way – Beaury St	Clarance Way near Showgrounds	Urbenville Hall	Urbenville Hall	Low Flood Island
Urbenville Forest Park	Clarence Way	Urbenville, Urbenville Sector	25 sites	Inundation	Urben St – Beaury St	Urben St	Urbenville Hall	Urbenville Hall	Low Flood Island
Tabulam Racecourse Campground	Racecourse Road, Tabulam	Tabulam, Bonalbo Sector	10 regular sites, additional 30 during race days	Isolation from 10% AEP event, inundation from 1% AEP event	NA	NA	High ground northwest of Racecourse outside PMF extent	RFS Station Tabulam	Rising Road Access

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. **NSW Government.** *Local Government (Manufactured Home Estates, Caravan Parks, Camping Grounds and Moveable Dwellings) Regulation 2005 Part 3 Division 3 Subdivision 7 Clause 123.* 2005.